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PREFACE
Jan Christian Smuts of South Africa was one of 
the most remarkable and interesting personalities of the 
past century* Although he came from a small, and in some 
ways, backward country, his influence spread throughout 
much of the world. In his lifetime of eighty years, 1370- 
1950, he had several careers. Although his profession 
was the law, he was also, at various times, a soldier, a 
statesman, a diplomat, a scientist, and a philosopher.
He served as a general officer in three wars and helped 
to found two world, peace organizations: the League of
Nations and the United Nations,
Many aspects of Smuts1s life and work are worthy 
of detailed study, but his role at the 1919 Paris Peace 
Conference was chosen for this paper for several reasons. 
First, the Peace Conference has been extensively examined 
from almost every angle, but no one has written specifi­
cally of Smuts1s role at the Conference. Second, this one 
episode in his life is a reasonably compact unit which can 
be fully treated in a work of this length, and yet it 
serves well to Illustrate the kind of man Smuts was and 
his impact on world events.
This work would never have been attempted,., much 
less completed, without the constant help and encourage­
ment of Professor A. Stanley Trickett, Chairman of the
iii
Department of History at the University of Omaha. I 
hereby express my gratitude for his encouragement not only 
In the preparation of this thesis but also throughout my 
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Jan Christian-*- Smuts Yras born a British, subject, 
in 1870, in Cape Colony, South Africa, where his ancestors, 
who Y^ ere predominantly Dutch, had lived since before 1 6 9 2.
As a second son he received no formal education until the 
death of his elder brother in 1332 made him the heir of 
the family1 s hopes. He then entered his first school and 
completed its eleven year course In four years. His mother 
had previously taught him at least the rudiments of reading 
and writing the English l a n g u a g e . 2 At the age of sixteen 
Smuts went on to Victoria College In Stellenbosch, Cape 
Colony, where he spent five of the happiest years of his 
life. He there met and fell In love with Sybella Margaretha 
Krige. She was to be the only love of his life, although 
he was not able to marry her until 1397• Their marriage
W. Keith Hancock, Smuts; The Sanguine Years, 
1370-1919 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 9 6 2),
p. 3s note, said that Smuts1s second name was spelled 
Christiaan In the baptismal register. Smuts1s son said 
that he always spelled it Christian, the same as his mater­
nal grandfather, Jan Christian de Vries, for whom he was 
named. Jan Christian Smuts, Jan Christian Smuts (New York: 
William Morrow & Company, 195271 P~* 39 This author will be 
cited hereafter as Smuts, Jr. Smuts always signed his name 
merely J. C. Smuts. Rene Kraus, Old Master: The Life of
Jan Christian Smuts (New York: e3 p9 Dutton & Co., 19^7)*
p. 10.
2
Hlancock, op. cit., pp. 3-11; Smuts, Jr., op. c i t. , 
pp. 12-13.
2proved to be a very successful and happy one, producing 
nine children, six of whom survived infancy. He took his 
degree in 18 91 in science and literature, winning honors 
in both. His high scholastic standing won him a scholar­
ship for overseas study; he used it to study law at
Cambridge.3
Smuts1s record at Cambridge was brilliant. He did 
both parts of the Law Tripos simultaneously and gained 
distinction in both--a feat unique in the history of the 
University. While in England he also found time to write 
a lengthy treatise called T,Walt Whitman--A Study in the 
Evolution of Personality.n This essay, which he unsuccess­
fully attempted to have published, set forth the beginnings 
of a system of philosophy, which he later called t!Holism!T 
and expressed more fully in his book Holism and Evolution.^
Upon his return to South Africa in 1 8 9?* Smuts set 
himself up to practice law in Capetown. He also became 
interested in politics, his first political action being a 
speech in support of Cecil Rhodes, who was then Premier of 
Cape Colony. To Smuts at that time Rhodes appeared as a 
great idealist. In fact RhodesTs vision of a great united 
British Africa was one which Smuts never repudiated as he •
^Hancock, op. cit., pp. 15-32: Smuts, Jr., op. cit., 
pp. llf-lS.
^Ibid., pp. 18-20; Hancock, op. cit., pp. 33-51*
3later did Rhodes himself*-^ The Jameson Raid of December 
29, 13959 turned Smuts against Rhodes and even for a time 
against all the British in South Africa. He left Capetown 
and moved to the Transvaal and to the support of Paul 
Kruger, the patriarchal president of that small Boer 
republic.^
In 1 8 9 8, Kruger appointed Srauts to the post of 
state attorney. In that capacity he worked with Kruger 
for the next year and a half to avoid a war with the 
British. Their efforts were unsuccessful, Smuts believed, 
because Sir Alfred Milner, the British High Commissioner, 
was determined to Incorporate the Transvaal as well as the 
Orange Free State Into the British Empire even if It took 
a war to do It. Although the two men later became friends 
and worked together In the Interests of the British Empire, 
Smuts never changed his opinion of Milner’s role in South 
Africa.*^
When war broke out late in 1 8 9 9* Smuts remained 
at his political post until the fall of Pretoria, In the 
summer of 1 9 0 0 , ended the more formal phase of the w a r . 8
5smuts, Jr., op. cit., pp. 21-25; Hancock, o p . cit. 
PP. 55-58.
Ibid., pp. 58-62; Smuts, Jr., op. cit., pp. 27-28. 
The word Boer, which means farmer, refers to the Inhabitant 
of South Africa of Dutch or Huguenot descent.
'Ibid., pp. 32-39-
O
Ibid. , pp. Ll2—5^4-•
Ij-
The Boers, however, did not surrender. They began a long 
period of guerilla, warfare which failed to preserve their 
independence, but which preserved their honor and self- 
respect and provided a mass of heroic legends to be passed 
on to their children. Smuts, too, became a commando leader. 
He led an extensive raid into Gape Colony and harried the 
British unmercifully for over a year. Smuts*s successful 
exploit, his first excursion into the more active pursuits 
of life, developed him both physically and intellectually.
He was now ready to ushoulder untold responsibilities. He 
had left his youth behind.tf9
Smuts was present when peace was made between the 
British and the Boers at Vereeniging in May 1902. The two 
small republics lost their independence, but Smuts found a 
new vision in the midst of defeat. Lord Kitchener, the 
British military commander, told Smuts, in a private talk, 
that the Liberals were likely to come to power in Britain 
in the near future and that they would in all probability 
grant a constitution to South Africa. This talk erased the 
majority of Smuts*s anti-British feelings and won him over 
to the British terms of peace. "Thus with a few simple 
words Kitchener had sown a seed of Empire in the heart of
Q
Kraus, op. cit., p. 3.10. See also Smuts, Jr., 
on. cit., pp. 55-72, 7^; Hancock, op. cit., pp. 133-L5.
5Smuts, with, what resiilts the world knows.113-0
Kitchener*s prophecy proved correct; the Liberals 
took office in 1905- Smuts then went on a "private” visit 
to England to see what he could make of the half-promise 
he had recieved at Vereeniging. The climax of his visit 
Y/as his talk with Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. Such were 
Smuts*s persuasive powers that he induced the new Prime 
Minister, who in turn persuaded the Cabinet, to give the 
former Boer republics self-government within the Empire.
"The feeling for the English that swept into him when 
Campbell-Bannerman so trusted the Boers in 1906 has been the 
strongest influence in Smuts* life. Smuts himself said,
"*They gave us back in everything but name, our country.
After four years. Has such a miracle of trust and magnanimity 
ever happened before? Only people like the English could do
7 ^it. They may make mistakes, but they are a big people. *1 
In the new government of the Transvaal, Smuts be­
came both Colonial Secretary and Minister of Education.
His closest friend, General Louis Botha, became Prime Minis­
ter. Smuts worked very hard during this period, "running
*^F. S. Crafford, Jan Smuts (Garden City, Hew York: 
Doubleday, Doran & Co., 191401 PP• 53-5^ -« See also Smuts, Jr., 
op. cit., pp. 75-76; Kraus, op. cit., pp. 118-19; Hancock, 
op. cit., p. l5§; Sarah Gertrude Millin, General Smuts 
(2 vols.; Boston: Little, Brown, and Company^ 193671 1* 1 6 9 .
11Ibid., I, 197-99-
1 PSmuts, Jr., op. cit., p. 91*
6not only his own portfolios "but those of most of the other 
members of the Cabinet as well, since many of the ministers 
were as yet inexperienced in the tasks of government.
Meanwhile, a movement for a closer union of the 
four colonies in South Africa developed, and Smuts took s. 
leading part in the movement.^ Representatives of the 
four colonies met in a National Convention in 1908. Smuts 
headed the delegation from the Transvaal. Long before the 
Convention convened, however, Smuts had been developing 
his own ideas for a constitution for all South Africa. He 
was the only delegate \iho had a definite plan on paper, 
complete to the last detail, when he arrived at the con­
vention.^ Because of his advance preparation, his large 
and able staff, and his own energy and drive, Smuts was 
able to exert a tremendous influence. The final Act of 
Union followed his ideas very closely.^ Smuts always re­
garded his work at the National Convention as the greatest 
single contribution he made to his homeland.^ In the new 
Union government Smuts held three portfolios from 1910-1912,
-^Smuts, Jr., op. cit., p. 9^*
"^L. M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 
1902-1910 (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, i9 6 0 ) , pp7 70-7^-
1 Ibid., pp. l52-6k.
l6Ibid., passim; Smuts, Jr., op. cit., pp. 97-103*
17rbid., p.
7those of Mines, Interior, and Defence; and two portfolios, 
those of Defence and Finance, from 1912-1919*^
When the World War broke out In 191^ -* there was no 
doubt in Smuts's mind where South Africa's duty lay; she 
would support the Empire against Germany. Prime Minister 
Botha agreed with his friend and told the British govern­
ment that it could withdraw its troops; South Africa would 
be responsible for her own security. Seven thousand British 
troops left at once. At the same time, the British govern­
ment requested that South Africa send troops to invade 
German South West Africa in order to capture its two wire­
less stations. When the South African ministers took steps 
to comply with this request, It became apparent that not 
all South Africans agreed with Smuts and Botha. Many had. 
never reconciled themselves to their defeat by the British. 
They looked upon the war as their opportunity to reverse 
the decision of 1902. Many hated Smuts and Botha for what 
was considered their treacherous cooperation with Britain. 
These malcontents rose In rebellion, and their leaders pre­
pared to join forces with the Germans In South West Africa. 
For a time Botha and Smuts showed infinite patience with the 
rebels. They warned; they begged; they appealed. Neither 
wished to move against their former comrades-in-arms. When 
It became evident that no appeals would dissuade the rebels,
■^Smuts, Jr., op. cit., p. Ll73*
8General Botha himself took the field against them, using 
loyal Boer troops as much as possible. The rebellion was 
put dovm rather easily, but it engendered much bitterness 
which has not yet fully a b a t e d . -**9
After the rebellion had been overcome, Botha and 
Smuts moved against German South West Africa. Their con­
quest of this sparsely-populated, almost-desert area, 
nexeciited with clockwork precision, was the first Allied 
success in the First World War."^
Early in 1 9 1 6, Smuts was offered a larger field
in which to exercise his military talents. He was given
the command of the campaign In East Africa with the rank
of lieutenant general in the British army, thus becoming
21Britain's second youngest general. In this campaign 
Smuts 11 showed himself a brilliantly efficient, resourceful 
and energetic Commander-In-Chief. 11 22 In less than a year, 
he had almost cleared the Germans from East Africa, but 
they then turned his own Boer-war game of guerilla, warfare 
against him. In fact, some German bands were still roaming
19'Smuts, Jr., pip, cit., pp. 121-33; Hancock, 
op. cit., pp. 377-9^-
20Kraus, op. cit., p. 2k2. See also Hancock, 
op. cit., pp. 3 9^-qOO•
21 1 .Smuts, Jr., op. cit., p. lqo.
22David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David hloyd 
George ( 6  vols.; Boston: LittTe^~T3rown Zz Co., 1933-37)*
IV, 91. Cited hereafter as War Memoirs.
9East Africa when the Treaty of Versailles was signed,
In January 1917» Smuts was recalled to South Africa 
and from there sent to England to attend the first Imperial 
’Jar Conference a3 a deputy for Prime Minister Botha, who 
felt he could not leave his post at that time.^* Smuts 
was not to return to South Africa until after the war was 
over and the treaty with Germany signed. To England Smuts 
brought
. , . an atmosphere of other-worldly calm. He was
unhurried, unapprehensive, reflective and serene.
In a moment which seemed to many in England the darkest 
in her history he spoke cheerfully and optimistically 
of the power of the British Empire, which in a happy 
Inspiration he rechristened the British Commonwealth 
of Nations. . . .
He insisted that the war was a war of ideals and 
that It must be fought until It ended in a victory 
of the spirit. And the nation . • . cheered the 
speaker with something of the religious enthusiasm 
with which over a year later Europe was to greet the 
oracular pronouncements of President Wilson.
Smuts not only attended the Imperial Conference but 
was also Included in the Imperial War Cabinet which met at 
the same time. The latter body was composed of the British 
Cabinet with representatives of the Dominions and India 
added. David Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister,
P1Kraus, op. cit., p. 25&«
2h'"Smuts, Jr., op. cit., p. l63.
25George Slocombe, A Mirror to Geneva (Hew York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 19 3&)'» PP* 77-73. See also Jan 
Christian Smuts, War-Time Speeches (Hew York: George PI.
Doran Company, 1917);Jan Christian Smuts, Toward a Better 
World (Hew York: World Book Company, 19WpT7 p.' 23'.
10
was immediately impressed by Smuts*s character and ability. 
He wrote:
Smuts is one of the most remarkable personalities 
of his time. He is that fine blend of intellect and 
Human sympathy which constitutes the understanding 
man. . . .His rare gifts of mind, and heart strength­
ened those finer elements which are apt to be over­
whelmed in an hour of savage temper and pitiless 
carnage* Of his practical contribution to our coun­
sels during these trying years, it is difficult to speak 
too highly.^
Sir Robert Borden, the Prime Minister of Canada, who himself 
played a very vital role at the Imperial Conferences and 
later at the Peace Conference, met Smuts for the first time 
in Lond.on in 1917* The two men developed an intimate 
friendship. Borden recorded that the "wonderful intellec­
tual powers, x’/ide vision and astonishing career" of Smuts 
"gave him a commanding place in our deliberations."^
Smuts did not return home at the conclusion of the 
Imperial Conference. Lloyd George explained why:
So deep was the impression that General Smuts 
made at this time upon his colleagues, nay, upon 
the nation, that w© would not let him leave lis when 
the Conference was ended. We insisted on keeping 
him here to help us at the centre with our war 
efforts. In every aspect of our multifarious tasks 
he was a valuable helper. He took his full share 
of the numerous committees set up to investigate, 
to advise, and subject to Cabinet assent, to direct 
action on vital Issues of policy and strategy. He
^Lloyd George, War Memoirs, IV, 17.
27Robert Laird Borden, Robert Laird Borden: Kis 
Memoirs, ed. Henry Borden (2 vols,; Hew York: The Mac­
millan Company, 1933)* H *  6 6 7 .
became and remained until the end or the War, an ac­
tive member of the British Cabinet for all the pur­
poses of war direction.
During the last year and a half of the war, Smuts carried 
out a number of diplomatic and organizational assignments 
for the War Cabinet. He assisted Lloyd George at an Inter- 
Allied Conference in Paris in June 1917; he surveyed the 
war front in 1913 and brought back a report on the condi­
tion of affairs there; and, after the Caporetto disaster, 
he accompanied Lloyd George to Italy to meet with the 
Italian Premier. One of Smuts1s most noted services was 
the organizing and setting up of an effective Air Ministry 
for Britain. ^
Prior to the 1919 P©a©© Conference, Smuts had be­
come a world-renowned, figure, honored for his roles in 
both peace and war. He attracted attention and comment on 
three continents. A noted American professor wrote In the 
Atlantic Monthly that Smuts was "one of the ablest paiblic 
men of our day. . . . Liberty and Freedom are words '-that
have not lost their savor for him. . . .  He is, above all, 
a philosopher and has learned to unify philosophy and
28Lloyd George, War Memoirs, IV, 3 6 . An InterestIn 
record of the work of the Imperial War Conferences and 
Cabinets of 1917 and 1913 from the point of view of a 
Dominion Prime Minister Is contained in Borden, on. cit., 
II, 66L-9&, 8 0 6-J4.5 .
^Lloyd George, War Memoirs, IV, 91-93* lIf-7^  9 *
[18 9, 118-21l. See also Crafford, on. cit., pp. 130-32.
12
e x p e r i e n c e .”30 When Colonel House was in England in 1917
as a personal emissary for President Wilson, he recorded
in his diary for November 13:
Nearly everyone I have met has asked me to be certain 
to see Smuts. He has grown to be the lion of the hour.
• . . My expectations were unusually high; it was not 
alone what I had heard of him, but I have been impressed 
by his speeches and statements which I have read from 
time to time. . . .  I have confidence in his opinion.
He is one of the few men I have met in the Government 
who do not seem tired. He is alert, energetic, and 
forceful* 31
At the Peace Conference many, especially among the 
British and American delegations, recorded favorable im­
pressions of Smuts. Bernard Baruch wrote:
Smuts represented the kind of reasoned idealism 
upon which Wilson hoped to build the postwar world.
In his effort to be fair to Germany, and In his sup­
port of a League of Nations, Smuts spoke for the 
most liberal and enlightened sentiment at the Con­
ference . 32
Winston Churchill recorded that Lloyd George felt he could 
turn to General Smuts when h© needed an riexponent of the 
Liberal creed In International affairs” and that Smuts could 
meet Wilson Ilon his own ground and speak his language to
OQ
Wallace Notestein, ”jan Smuts,” At1antic Monthly, 
CXXII (July, 1913), 111-12.
31Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel 
House (Ip vols.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1923)',
III, 229-30.
B e r n a r d  II. Baruch, Baruch: The Public Years
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, i9 6 0 ) , pn. Tolp-lOp.
Cited hereafter as Public Years.
Wilson’s surprise and gratification,”^3 Colonel House 
wrote that some men at Paris "towered above their fellows, 
and these became centres of groups from which, policies and 
opinions radiated,” He classified Smuts with Wilson, 
Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando, Paderewski, Venizelos, 
Makino, and Wellington Koo as ”among the statesmen having 
distinct and enthusiastic followers, ”3^4- Clive Day, of the 
American team of experts at the Conference, named Smuts, 
as well as Lord Robert Cecil of England and Leon Bourgeois 
of Prance, as one of the recognized intellectual and moral 
leaders of the d a y . 35 Harold HIcolson, the young British 
diplomat who accompanied Smuts on his mission to Hungary, 
recorded In his diary an admiration for Smuts that was just 
short of adoration. 36 One of the most Interesting appraisals 
was recorded by Ray Stannard Baker, the director of the 
American press at Paris:
General Smuts was one of the two or three world 
leaders developed by the Peace Conference. An
■^Winston L. S. Churchill, The Aftermath: The
World Crisis, 1913-1926 (Hew York: Charles Scribner's
Sons", 1929) 7 P • 13 2".”
3 I1
Edward Mandell House and Charles Seymour (eels. } , 
What Really . Happened at Paris (Hew York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1921) / P- v'i 11.
35Clive Day, ”The Atmosphere and Organization of 
the Peace Conference,” ibid., p. 2 7 .
36Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919 (2d ed.; Hew 
York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 193917 pp. 292-303. See
Chapter VI below.
xlf.
extraordinary man, sca.rcely fifty years old; one of the 
youngest leaders at the Conference. . . , He developed
early as a thoroughgoing Idealist. . . .  His knowledge 
of world conditions was extensive and realistic. . . .
Pie was one of President Wilson’s strongest supporters. 
Personally, he was a rather taciturn and unapproachable 
man, with a high forehead, steely eyes, straight brows 
depressed In a habitual half frown, tightly closed 
lips, and a powerful chin; he was a man who looked the 
part of the leader. He was always at hand when there 
was difficult, work to d o . 37
There were, on the other hand, a few men at the 
Conference who were not favorably impressed by Smuts.
Georges Clemenceau, the Prime Minister of Prance, in his 
catalogue of the men at the Conference, referred to "Smuts 
of South Africa, with his forced smile, who made the mis­
take of leaving papers about in which he vented his spleen 
against the F r e n c h . "3^ Herbert Hoover thought Smuts "had 
full knowledge of Old World Diplomacy, an independent mind 
and often real statesmanship." He made It clear, however, 
that he did not trust the South African. He thought Smuts 1s 
stand on mandates was mere trickery and so suspected his 
motives in other a r e a s . 39 Robert Lansing, the American 
Secretary of State, cred_Ited Smuts with "Intellectual
37pay Stannard Baker, Woodrovir Wilson and World 
Settlement (3 vols.; Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter
Smith, 19'6'0), I, 22k.
38Georges Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Vic­
tor:/, trans. P. M. Atkinson (New York: Ilarcourt, Brace
and Company, 1930)9 P* 150.
39Herbert Clark Hoover, The Ordeal of Woodrow 
Wilson (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1958), pp.
2 3)1, 2I.l2-1.I-3* See Chapter IV below.
15
honesty," as well as "kindliness and c o n s i d e r a t i o n , I n  
another work, however, the most he would concede to Smuts 
was a creative mind, while identifying him with those re­
formers whose peculiar vanity is that they must invent 
something new and different, not being willing to accept 
methods which have been tested by experience. This judg­
ment was in connection with SmutsTs work on the mandates 
system.^*
Smuts had gained a wealth of experience In various 
fields prior to 1919 anc^  attained to a position of
high esteem in the eyes of his fellow men. Therefore, 
being excellently prepared and equipped for the task of 
negotiating a peace, he was able to play a prominent part 
at the 1919 Ps-^ is Peace Conference.
Robert Lansing, The Big Four and Others of the 
Peace Conference (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921),
p”I Idd. Cited hereafter as Big Four.
Ji.l1 Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: A Per­
sonal Narrative (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921),
p^ 15o. Cited "hereafter as Peace negotiations.
CHAPTER II
SMUTS AND THE CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION
For an understanding of the role played by Smuts 
at the Paris Peace Conference, some knowledge of its 
organization and procedure is necessary. First, the 
Conference was not planned in advance; It grew out of the 
organizations which the Allies had set up to conduct the 
war.-*- Second, It was not a static body, but changed from 
time to time both in structure and procedure to conform to 
the needs of the moment. ^  Third, the Conference was an 
extremely large body. Long before the war was over, infor­
mation-gathering organizations had been set up In France,
oGreat Britain, and the United States. - Many of the exr^erts 
who had served with these organizations were included in the 
delegations which went to Paris. For example, the British 
Empire delegation consisted of more than two hundred persons.
-*-F. S. Mars ton, The Peace Conference of 1919* Or- 
ganisation and Procedure (London: Oxford University Press,
m w ,  p . t .------
2
H. W* V. Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace 
Conference of Paris (6  vols.; London: Henry Frowde and
Hodder & Stoughton, 1 9 2 0-2l|) , I, 2 3 6-lt3 .
3
Andre Tardieu, The Truth about the Treaty (Indian­
apolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1921"), pp. 8>-36 , 91 >
Charles Homer Haskins and Robert H. Lord, Some Problems of 
the Peace Conference (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1 9 2 0 ) , pp~» 2 2-2k.
^Marston, op. cit., p. 2 2 8 .
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Altogether, seventy plenipotentiaries, or one hundred and 
four counting substitutes, and at least 1 ,0 3 7  other dele­
gates represented twenty-seven states and five British
of the five great powers, Prance, G-reat Britain, the United 
States, Italy, and Japan, and their Foreign Ministers, 
acted as the steering committee for the unwieldy Confer­
ence from January 12 until March 2l{.* Although it met 
almost daily throughout this period, it had no definite 
program to follow and merely worked from day to day. As a
result, It entirely failed to solve or even to tackle most
Aof the major problems facing the Conference. Pour months
after the Armistice, only the military, naval, and air
terms of the treaty with Germany had been d.ecided upon*?
Before this body
. . . each special interest, each minor nationality,
had a chance to come forward and state its case, 
usually at considerable length* Whatever was said 
in French was translated into English, and vice 
versa. The sessions grew long and tiresome, and 
progress was slow.
The slowness of progress was not entirely due to the proce-
dominions at the Peace Conference.^
The Council of Ten, which consisted of the Heads
13
dupe adopted. The Council of Ten had Inherited from the 
Supreme Council of the war period a heavy burden of problems 
of an economic nature. Moreover, the Europe of 1919 v/as a 
hungry Europe, and the Council feared that anarchy might 
follow in the wake of hunger. Therefore, it was concerned 
with feeding the defeated peoples, which involved problems 
of the blockade, of rationing, and of the transport of
materials.9
On March 2hr, the Heads of the British, American,
French, and Italian delegations withdrew from the Council 
of Ten and began to meet as the Council of Pour. At last 
the directing body of the Conference had assumed a form 
which enabled it to make rapid progress. In the next six 
weeks, It had settled many of the problems with which the 
Council of Ten had been unable or unwilling to deal. By 
May 7, it had a treaty ready to present to G-ermany, and It 
continued to be the real heart of the Conference until the 
Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 23.^  After the 
withdrawal of the Big Pour, the Foreign Ministers continued 
to meet as the Council of Five. An indication of the Im­
portance of the various Councils of the Conference can be 
inferred from the frequency of their meetings. The Council
^Haskins and Lord, op. cit., p. 5? Temperley, op. cit., 
I, 25>6; Marston, 0 0 . cit., pt lOli.
Ibid., p. 16k.
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oT Ten met seventy-two times; the Council of Five met 
thirty-nine times; but the Council of Four met one hun­
dred and forty-five times.H
In addition to the Councils, the Conference also 
met in plenary sessions. These sessions were formal in 
nature; the program was thoroughly planned in advance and 
rigidly controlled by Clemenceau as president of the Con­
ference. There were only six plenary sessions before the 
treaty with G-ermany was signed, and the only one of these 
to be of real Interest was that of February lip, when the 
Covenant of the League of nations was presented by Woodrow 
Wilson.
Other Important bodies at the Conference were the 
special commissions or committees which were set up as the 
need arose and to which questions were referred for pre­
liminary study and report. Five important territorial 
commissions were organized, as well as commissions on the 
League of nations, on reparations, on finance, on waterways, 
and on many of the other problems of the peace. A commission 
usually consisted of one or two members from each of the
11Tardieu, op. cit., p. 97; Lay, op. cit., p. 33.
12Temperley, op. cit. , I, 2l|-9-5>0; U.S., Department 
of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1919* t^ie Paris Peace Conference (13 vols.; 
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19lj.2-!j-7) 9
III, 208-39* Cited hereafter as For. Reis, of U.S., Peace 
Conference.
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five great powers, plus a few other members from some of 
the smaller powers. According to Tardieu, before peace was 
made with. Germany, there were fifty-eight of these bodies 
which held a total of 1,61|_6 sessions. Some of the best work 
of the Conference was done by the commissions* On the other 
hand, some questions were never referred to them but were 
held to be the exclusive province of the Big Four.^^ The 
commissions did not frame treaty articles. They gathered 
and sifted all available information on the problem with 
which they were dealing and reported their findings to the 
Supreme Council, 1-1- which used the information to arrive at 
a final decision as to how the treaty article should be 
written. The decision of the Council was then referred to 
the Drafting Commission which rendered valuable service by 
nclothing often loosely-worded decisions in concise and 
explicit phrases, which could be inserted, directly into 
the Treaty.
This unplanned, empirically-organized body of men, 
representing the victors in the war, managed to get a
■^Temperley, op. cit., I, 257; Tardieu, op. cit.,
PP» 93* 97; Haskins and Lord, op. cit., pp. 28-30; Day, 
op. cit., pp. 25-30. See For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Con­
ference, III, 6 3-9 0 9 ^or composition of all the com­
missions .
1 1
Prior to March 25* th.e Supreme Council was the 
Council of Ten; after that date, it was the Council of Four.
15 / /Temperley, 0 0 . cit. , I, 2oo.
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treaty together by May 6. On that day it was presented to
i Aa plenary session of the Conference, and on the follov/- 
ing day it was presented to the C-erman delegation. ^  The
-j p
Germans signed the treaty at Versailles on June 28. Be­
tween May 7 and June 28 the Allies and the Germans did not 
meet; all communications concerning the treaty were carried 
on in writing.^9
How did Smuts fit into the organization of the 
Peace Conference? The answer to this question involves 
first of all the problem of the representation of the 
British dominions at Paris in 1919*
The dominions, by declaring war instantly on the 
decision of the mother country in 1 9ll]-* had proclaimed 
their belief in the rightness of that decision.
Fully as they approved, it was, however, a decision 
which they had had no formal share in framing, and 
to which they were formally bound, whether they liked 
it or not, by the existing legal state of the impe­
rial constitution. ^
Once committed to the war, the dominions, especially Canada,
Australia, and Hew Zealand, supported it 7/hole-heartedly,
as did India to a lesser extent. The contributions of the
l8Fo:r. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, III, 33?l--79.
17Ibld., III, kl3-20.
l8Xbid., III, k21-23.
197Marston, op. cit., p. 1 9 2 .
^James A. Williamson, A Short Histop y of British 
Expansion: The Modern Empire and Commonwealth (kth ed. ;
London: Macmillan 5:” Co. , 195'8) * p"* 295-
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dominions named above were, in proportion to population, 
as great as that of any of the European nations and was 
far greater than that of the United S t a t e s T h e  domin­
ions felt that their contributions to the war effort had 
earned them complete nationhood and a right to control 
their own foreign policy. They insisted, therefore, on 
the right to participate in the Peace Conference, apart 
from Great Britain, and on an equality with at least the
o p
smaller nations represented. ^ Such insistence began at 
the first Imperial War Conference in 1917 v/hen Sir Robert 
Borden moved and Smuts seconded a resolution to that ef­
fect.^ The following year, the dominion representatives 
again pressed for separate representation at Paris.^ On 
the last day of 1918, the Imperial Cabinet adopted a proposal 
submitted by Borden.
Under this proposal each Dominion was to have the 
same representation as the smaller allied nations 
and, in addition, representatives of the British
Empire were to be drawn from a panel on which each
Dominion Prime Minister would have a place. The ^
reoresentation of India was to be on the same basis. ^
21 1 1Temperley, op. cit., VI, 3d45 Williamson, 
op. cit., pp. 288-92.
22Ibid., p. 295; David Lloyd George, The Truth 
about the Peace Treaties (2 vols.; London: Victor Gol-
lancz, 193d) , I* 202-201].. Cited hereafter as Peace Treaties.
2? / / /Borden, on. cit., II, oo7-7o.
!'Ibid., 1 1 , 8 6 6-9 5 .
^hbid., II, 89^-95* See also Lloyd George,
Peace Treaties, I, 20o-209*
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In th.is struggle, Borden recorded that he had the Tull 
backing or the other dominion representatives as v/ell as 
of the British Prime Minister and his colleagues.^
When the Council or Ten began to meet on January 
1 2 , the rirst question taken up was that or the represen­
tation or the various nations. It was at once agreed that 
the main duty or drarting the treaties would remain in the 
hands or the great powers* The Council then decided which 
other countries could have delegates and how many each 
could have. When the problem or the dominions was raised, 
Lloyd George pressed Tor the plan accepted by the Imperial 
Cabinet. President Wilson entered a mild protest against 
this Increase In the representation or the British Empire. 
The solution rinally arrived at, on Wilson1s suggestion, 
was that Canada, South Alrlca, Australia, and India were 
each to have two representatives and New Zealand, one. 
Newroundland was not to have separate representation.^ 
Under this arrangement Smuts became a plenipotentiary 
from South Alrlca along with Prime Minister Louis Botha.
2^Bord.en, op. cit., II, 89k.
27 ,Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, 21/1-17; Tem-
perley, op. cit., I, 2br7:=W 9 T f por. 'r8Is. of
U.S., Peace' "c'o'ni erenco, III, '[.8 2-8 9 , 5>31-33* Other
representation was as rollows: the five great powers
had rive delegates each; Belgium, Brasil, and Serbia
had three each; China, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Eedjaz,
Poland, Portugal, Rumania, and Siam had two each; most
or the Latin American countries had one delegate each.
Temperley, op. cit., I, l-S-98.
2k
The dominion representatives also formed a panel from which, 
the fifth member of the British delegation was drawn. In 
this way, all of the dominion delegates served on one or 
another of the important conference commissions. General 
Smuts was appointed to the one which drafted the League
ry O
of Nations Covenant.'1'
The British Empire delegation, consisting of six 
separate delegations, also continued to function as a 
unit. It held regular meetings throughout the Conference, 
usually -under the chairmanship of A. J. Balfour, the British 
Foreign Minister, although Lloyd George led the group on 
several important occasions. At these meetings questions 
of policy were discussed, and Lloyd George generally took 
to the Supreme Council the views of the entire British 
Empire rather than just those of the United Kingdom. As 
was his wont, General Smuts spoke seldom, but when he did 
speak, he was listened to with respect and his views often 
modified the final d e c i s i o n . ^9
was the Council of Four, composed of Vittorio Orlando, 
the Prime Minister of Italy, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and 
President Wilson. Because of his special relationship with
The most important body of the entire Conference
arston, op. cit., p. 101; Lloyd George, Peace
two of the Big Four, Smuts was able to exercise an impor­
tant influence on the Conference, Orlando was the least 
important member of the Big Four, Partly because he could 
not speak English, he did not take as active a part in the 
general discussions of the Supreme Council as did the other 
three, who used English freely among themselves. Instead, 
he and the other Italians at the Conference concentrated 
their entire efforts on the advancement of Italy.30 Clemen- 
ceau dominated the Conference. As Prime Minister of the 
host nation, he presided at the plenary sessions as well 
as at the meetings of the Ten or Four. He was shrewd, 
clever, completely realistic In his approach to the prob­
lems of peace, and passionately devoted to France.3^- Much 
that was in the final treaty could be traced to him. There 
is no evidence that Smuts influenced either Orlando or 
Clemenceau in any way.
Lloyd George was above all a politician. He was a 
bluff and hearty opportunist whose behavior was sometimes 
rather erratic as he tried to fit his actions to public 
o p i n i o n . 32 He and Smuts had worked together from the time 
of the Imperial Conference of 1^17 * and each had formed a
30Lansing, Big Four, pp. 121-22; Lloyd George,
Peace Treaties, I, 25>3; Tardieu, op. cit. , p. 101.
-^Ibld. , p. 102; Lansing, Big Four, pp. 10-3&. 
3 2Xbid., pp. 77-73.
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warm appreciation for the other. It was not until I9L3 
tliat Smuts ranked Churchill as high, as Lloyd George as a 
leader of the British people.33 Lloyd George said of 
Smuts: "It is difficult to overrate the importance of
the contribution General Smuts made to our peace prepara­
tions. . . .  I have no hesitation in saying that Smuts 
was the ablest man that came to help us from the outside 
Empire."-^ of Smuts's Influence on Lloyd George there can 
be no doubt. One writer remarked:
Prom a talk with General Smuts he /Lloyd George/ would 
go to a meeting of the T,Big Four" with proposals which 
made M. Clemenceau wonder (sometimes aloud) whether the 
Allies were to ask Germany's pardon for having taken
the liberty of beating h e r . 35
President Woodrow Wilson was the fourth of the Big 
Pour. Volumes have been written about his character and 
personality and about his role at the Peace Conference—  
much of it contradictory. Smuts thought Wilson was a 
greater man than Lincoln. He praised Wilson's idealism 
but thought he was not practical enough for the rough and 
tumble of the Conference. Unlike many, however, Smuts be­
lieved Wilson was right to come to the Conference personally.
"Only Wilson could have put through the League and did. 
The other statesmen weren't concerned about the League
"Smuts, Jr., op. cit., p. 203.
-^ '~Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, 2 6 0-6 1 .
T. Raymond /Edward Raymond Thompson/, Mr. Lloyd
George (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1922) , pi 235*
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except as an instnment for their own ends--that is to 
say their country’s ends: Wilson put the League above
this greedy squabbling. It was for the League he com­
promised on other things”3^
Nor did Smuts believe that Wilson was "bamboozled” as Keynes 
wrote in his classic caricature of the President,37 When 
Smuts and Wilson met at the Conference, each discovered a 
kindred spirit In the other. Because of their common de­
votion to the League of Nations, they easily developed a 
mutual friendship. The President had a sincere esteem and 
affection for Smuts that surpassed his regard for any of 
his American colleagues except Colonel H o u s e .3® Smuts’s 
influence on Wilson affected the final treaty in at least 
three areas: the League of Nations, the mandates system,
and reparations,39
3^Smuts, Jr., op. cit,, pp. 203“20Jjr. See also 
Millin, op. cit., II, lo1-621 Jan Christian Smuts, “Wood­
row Wilson’s Place In History,” Current History, XIV 
(April, 1921),
37John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences 
of the Peace (New'York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920),
~  551 Smuts, Jr., op. cit., p. 2051 Millin, op. cit.,
II, 162.
38 Seth P. Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the 
Peace Conference of 1919 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 19 31), p . 73•
39See below, Chapters III, IV, and V. See also 
George Curry, "Woodrow Wilson, Jan Smuts, and. the Ver­
sailles Settlement,” The American Historical Review, LXVI 
(July, 1961), 963-86.
CHAPTER I I I
SHUTS AND TIIE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
Undoubtedly, the most important work done by Smuts 
at the Paris Peace Conference was his part in formulating 
the Covenant of the League of Nations. As early as Hay
lip, 1917a Smuts had supported the League of Nations Idea,
In a speech In the Central Hall, Westminster. He said In 
part:
In some form or other we must bring about a league 
or a union of nations with, some common organ of 
consultation on all vital Issues. . . .  All the
schemes that I have heard of so far have failed to
carry conviction to my mind that they are practi­
cal and that they will achieve the objects w© have 
In view.' I would favour something more elastic, 
something more flexible, something which will be 
capable of adapting Itself to the very complex cir­
cumstances which arise from time to time in our 
complex European relations.
I think It would be the proper course that the 
peace treaty which Is concluded after this war shall 
contain as an integral part of it the fundamental 
provisions, not in detail, bi.it in principle, which 
will safegiiard the future peace of the world.
A month after the Armistice, Smuts published, on 
December lo, 1913, a pamphlet entitled The League of ITa-
p
tlons: A Practical Suggestion. This publication proved
to be very Important as many of the suggestions embodied
Smuts, War-Eime Speeches, pi. 5>5-6o.
p
David Hunter Hiller, The Drafting of the Covenant 
(2 vols.; New York: G. P* Putnamrs Sons, 192d) , II, Docu­
ment p, 23-60. Cited hereafter as Covenant.
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in it eventually were incorporated into the Covenant of the 
League. This was due in part, no doubt, to the universal 
rule enunciated by Miller that "any definite detailed draft 
prepared, in advance by one of the parties /meeting to pre­
pare an agreement/ will to some extent appear in the final 
text, not only in principle but even in l a n g u a g e , "3 but it 
was also due to the inherent excellence and practicality 
of the document. Students of the League of Nations have 
been generous in their praise of this work. One writer 
said that it was the first plan for a League of Nations to 
be 11 deeply tinged with the idealism for which the post-war 
world was w a i t i n g . L o r d  Robert Cecil, who was one of 
the most influential men in the history of the League in 
his own right, praised Smuts's pamphlet as a brilliant per­
formance.^ Another writer called it a "most remarkable 
pamphlet11 and one "which can never be too often consulted 
by those who would understand the origin and development
r
of the League. " 0 Still another student of the League of 
Nations wrote:
'X
"miHer, Covenant, I, 3.
h/rFelix Horley, The Society of Nations (Washington: 
The Brookings Institute*^ 1932) / p. 20/
5
S. A. Robert Cecil, Viscount Cecil, A Great ex­
periment (New York: Oxford University Press, IQwl) , pT 6o.
<r
William S. Rappard, Uniting Burone (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1930) ,”pn/ 200, 261}..
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Tills great paper, expressed in cogent and moving 
language, immediately had a profound effect. It 
crystallised ideas and aspirations which had been 
held In nany quarters, and made deep Impression 
on both Lord Cecil and President W i l s o n .7
Another writer commented:
General Smuts rendered a service to the advocates of 
a realistic League by supporting them with the whole 
weight of his authority as soldier, statesman and 
philosopher, and it may be added, with the persuasive 
power of his pen. 3
The appreciation of Smuts*s pamphlet has grown with the
years. A historian of the League of Nations, writing
in 1 9 5 2 , said of it:
Smuts*3 work was from every point of view the 
climax of all the thought and labour expended on 
the League idea before the Paris Conference. . . .
Zii7 was . . . the first plan put out to the world 
by one who held a pre-eminent official position, 
had played a prominent part in the conduct of the 
war, and possessed unique experience in military 
and political affairs. But the contents of the 
pamphlet were even more remarkable than Its source. 
Here at last was a work worthy of the greatness of 
its subject. Here, in language worthy of Milton 
or of Burke, were high idealism, acute political 
insight, a profound understanding of the hopes and 
sentiments of the rank and file of soldiers and 
civilians, clear and practical administrative plan­
ning. The purpose, and to a great extent the con­
sequence, of Smuts*s proposals was to raise the 
discussion on to a new plane
70. K. Webster and Sydney Herbert, The League of 
Nations in Theory and Practice (Boston: Houghton Llifflin
C ompany, 1933)* P• 37•
8AIfred 2innern, The League of Nations and the 
Rule of Lav/, 1913-1935 (London: Macmillan and Company,
1933), p. 209".
^F. p. Walters, A History of the League of Nations 
(2 vols.; London: Oxford tTriiverslty Press, 1952) > I» 27.
31
Smuts*s pamphlet is composed of twenty-one short 
articles ’which are interspersed throughout a much more 
lengthy argument in favor of his proposals. These comments 
are "written in a moving and apToealing style; tending in­
deed to disarm criticism of the text of the Articles 
suggested.1 1 jn the first article, Smuts suggested that 
the setting up of a League of Hations should be considered 
the primary task of the Peace Conference.-^- The organiza­
tion which Smuts envisioned, however, went beyond the idea 
of a mere league to preserve peace. He saw it as
. . . a great organ of the ordinary peaceful life of
civilization. . . .  It is not sufficient for the 
league merely to be a sort of deus ex machina, called 
in in very grave emergencies when the siDectre of war 
appears; if it is to last, It must be much more. It 
must become part and parcel of the common International 
life of states, It must be an ever visible, living 
working organ of the polity of civilization. It must 
function so strongly in the ordinary peaceful Inter­
course of states that it becomes irresistible in their 
disputes: its neace activity must be the foundation-*■ j- TO
and guarantee of its war power.
Professor Rappard commented on these lines: "This concep­
tion of the League as an agency of peaceful cooperation,
. . . came step by step to be shared also by the other
members of the Crillon C o m m i s s i o n . " - ^  The earlier drafts
^Miller, Covenant, I, 3)1.
, II, 27.
1 2Ibifl., II, 2k-25.
Ujiappard, Uniting Europe, p. 2 6 3.
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ol* Phillimore, House, and Wilson*^* Had pictured the League 
as an international judge and policeman only. It was due 
to General Smuts that a broader view of the role of the 
League was taken. The League continued to develop along 
the lines first suggested by Smuts. By 1 9 2 9, its "coopera­
tive activities” had Ttcompletely eclipsed its coercive 
functions.
Articles 2 through 9 contain Smuts*s plan for a 
mandates system. The development of this Idea deserves a 
separate chapter and will not be dealt with here.-^
The next major section of Smuts*s plan, articles 
10 through ill, contain the General*s Ideas on the consti­
tution for the League. On the one hand, he emphatically 
rejected the idea that the League should become a super­
state, but on the other hand, he just as emphatically 
believed that it should be more than an Ineffective de­
bating society. Smuts thought that the scheme he had 
worked out would avoid both of these extremes. First, he 
believed that the division of powers Into legislative, 
executive, and judicial, was a natural division and should
3-^ -See Miller, Covenant, II, for these plans: 
Phillimore Plan, Document 1, pp. 3-6; House Plan, Docu­
ment 2, pp. 7-11; Wilson*s first draft, Document 3>
pp. 12-15*
15> r /Rappard, Uniting Europe, pp. 2 6 3-6 5 •
■^See Chapter IV below.
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be followed in forming a constitution for the League. ^
The legislative branch he called the G-eneral Conference.
In this body all the states may be considered equal 
and should vote as states. . . .  The conference . . •
may become a most powerful and Influential factor In 
moulding international public'opinion. . . • With 
that public opinion behind it, /tlie lcs.gue7  may S° 
confidently forward vjith its great tasks; deprived of 
that support, all its power for good will be neu­
tralized and nullified. . . . The enlightened public
all over the world will have to be taught to think 
internationally, to look at public affairs, not merely 
from the sectional national point of view, but also 
from a broad human International point of view. And 
the debates periodically taking place in the general 
conference might well become of immense Importance In 
this great task of forming and educating a strong body 
of international opinion behind and in support of the 
league and Its work. . . . The Powers should not grudge
strong representation to the smaller states, as In any 
case the resolutions will only be in the nature of 
recommendations to the national Parliaments.
In 1929 Professor Rappard wrote:
These lines, written two full years before the 
first Assembly met, give an astonishingly true pic­
ture of what that remarkable body Is and seems likely 
ever more to become. Its periodic meetings, its 
consiiltatlve character, Its main function as a focus 
of what has come to be called the spirit of Geneva 
and as an educator of national opinion, the publicity 
and parliamentary tone of its debates, and the rela­
tively important part played in It by the representa­
tives of the minor states, all these traits, which 
subsequent history has gradually revealed, G-eneral 
Smuts foresaw with a truly prophetic eye. For once 
. . . it was the statesman with the boldest imagina­
tion and the highest ambitions who was right in his 
previsions. Coming from a minor state, General Smuts 
naturally did not share his British, American, end 
French colleagues1 rather contemptuous views of the
■^Miller, Covenant, II, 33-39*
l3Ibid., II, 39-W, lt-5.
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international role of snail countries. . . • And coming 
from a free and from a now state, with no diplomatic 
service and no diplomatic traditions, lie naturally and 
very rightly placed the political importance or parlia­
mentary and of public opinion above that of ambassadors 
and ministers.**-/
Because he believed that the General Conference 
would be too large to do any real work, Smuts suggested a 
Council of nine or ton members as the executive body of 
the League. He thought the great powers, which he named 
as the United States, the British Empire, Prance, Japan, 
and Germany, 11 as soon as she has a stable democratic 
Government,?f should be permanently represented on the 
Council. Two additional members of the Council should 
be chosen from a panel of the intermediate powers and two 
from a panel of the smaller powers. A minority of three 
should be able to veto any action of the Council. Smuts 
explained:
The advantage of this constitution is that the 
Great Powers obtain a majority--although only a bare 
majority--representation on the council and could not 
therefore complain that their interests run the risk 
of being swamped by the multiplicity of small states.
On the other hand the intermediate and minor states 
receive a very substantial representation on the 
league, and could not complain that they are at the 
mercy of the Great Powers.^
I.Iorley commented that in these articles "devoted to the
constitutional organization of the League, the Smuts plan
■^Rappard, Uniting Europe, p. 207. 
^Hiller, Covenant, II, ill.
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came closer than any of its predecessors to the ultimate 
arrangement. " 2 1  jn fact, in a few years' time the compo­
sition of the Council came to follow the Practical Sugges­
tion more closely than it did the Covenant, for Smuts had 
suggested the system of regional representation which, 
although not embodied in the Covenant, was later put into 
practice.22 Furthermore, almost everyone who had suggested 
a plan for a League of Nations had envisioned a body such 
as the General Conference, but fewer had seen the need for 
a smaller executive body such as Smuts called the Council.
Smuts next recommended three ideas which he thought 
would go far toward outlawing war: the abolition of con­
scription, the limitation of armaments, and the nationali­
zation of munitions factories. 2 k He did not claim that 
these proposals were original vdLth him, nor did he minimize 
the difficulties inherent In them. He realized that, If 
they were to be carried out, a fundamental change would 
have to take place in the realm of International relations. 
It was just such a change that he hoped the League would 
bring about. He wrote: "The psychological and moral
21miorley, op. cit., p. 2 1 .
^ Ibid.; Hiller, Covenant, II, Iil-k2; Walters, 
on. cit., I, 335.
^Miller, Covenant, I, 3 6 ; Horley, op. cit♦,
pp. 2 1-2 2 .
p ] ,
"'Hiller, Covenant, II, 52.
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conditions are ripe Tor a great change. The moment has
o r~i
come for one of the great creative acts of history." ^
The final section of SmutsTs pamphlet, including 
articles 18 through 2 1 , is concerned with the settlement 
of international disputes. It was not original with him, 
but was taken largely from a plan prepared by a committee 
advised by Lord Robert Cecil and headed, by Lord Phillimore, 
one of the “most learned and high-minded" of the judges 
of the High Court in England. ^ 6 Smuts did not outlaw wan 
altogether, but merely provided that it should not be 
allowed except as a final resort, after the dispute had. 
been thoroughly Investigated and reported upon, lie be­
lieved that states would not agree to anything more drastic 
at that time, but he expressed the hope that;
* * * if such a period of deliberation and delay is
established, there will be time for extreme war 
passions to cool down, and for public opinion to be 
aroused and organized on the side of peace. And. In 
view of the enormous force which public opinion would 
exert In such a case, the general expectation is that 
it will prove effective, and that the delay, and the 
opportunity thus given for further reflection and 
the expression of public opinion, will in most cases 
prevent the parties from going to war.^7
Smuts further suggested that, if any member of the League
attacked another member of the League, the offending
^Hiller, Covenant, II, ip7 •
^Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, 6 0 p - 6 o 6 .
^Miller, Covenant, II, 53*
party should “Ipso facto become at v/ar wl th all the other 
members of the League, which shall subject It to complete 
economic and financial b o y c o t t . ”23 Although the last four 
articles of his plan were incorporated Into articles 12,
13, 15 9 and l6 of the Covenant, Srauts does not deserve the 
credit for them as they were not original with him.
President Wilson received a copy of Smuts1 s plan 
shortly after his arrival in Europe in December 1913.
Lloyd George told a friend that V/ilson "swallowed It 
whole” and that much of his plan was borrowed from Smuts.29 
R. 3. Baker said, “The Smuts plan especially impressed 
the President as being well thought out, and convinced him 
that his own draft needed r e v i s i o n . ”30 Wilson acknowledged 
his debt to Smuts on at least t’wo occasions: once, before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on August 1 9, 
3.919,^ and earlier, before the Council of Ten on January
21, 19199 when he explained how his own plan for a League
of Nations had been formulated. He had taken the Philli-
nore report, which had been sent to him in Hay of I9 1S
^°Miller, Covenant, II, 55*
po'George Allardice Riddell, First Baron Riddell,
Lord Riddell1s Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and 
After, 1913"-1923 (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1 9 3k) ,
p. 279.
-^R. S. Baker, 0 0 . cit., I, 22k.
-^U.S., Congressional Record, 6 6th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1919, LVTII, Part k7 koi?.
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and had asked Colonel House to rewrite it for him. He had 
then rewritten the draft prepared by Colonel House. After 
his arrival in Europe, he had. studied, the plans prepared 
by G-eneral Smuts and Lord Robert Cecil and had talked with 
Leon Bourgeois, the foremost French advocate of a League 
of Rations, after which he had. completely rewritten the 
draft he had brought with him from America. 32 Baker
explained in more detail how President Wilson used SmutsTs 
suggestions.
From Smuts he took over a whole new scheme of 
organization, establishing a smaller Council in 
addition to the general conference of the League.
. . . All this constitutional machinery was lifted
bodily from Smuts*s plan by Wilson. . . .
Smuts* s recommendations on the subject of arbi­
tration and the guarantees surrounding it were also 
taken over, partly in substitution for former clauses, 
partly in addition to them. . . .
The article on reduction of armaments was expanded 
by tvro paragraphs taken from Smuts--one on the aboli­
tion of conscription, the other on the establishment 
of scales of equipment and war material corresponding 
to actual forces.
The most considerable section of new material 
incorporated, in Wilson* s new draft from the Smuts
3^For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, III, 
6 6 8-6 9 * These documents are all reprinted in Hiller, 
Covenant, II: the Phillimore Plan, Document 1, pp.
3-8; House * s draft, Document 2, pp. 7-11; Wilson1s first 
draft, Document 3* PP* 12-15; the Smuts plan, Document 
5, pp. 23-60; the Cecil plan, Document 6 , po. 6i~61l; 
Wilson*s second draft or first Paris draft, Document 7 9 
pp. 65-93; Wilson*s third draft or second Paris draft, 
Document 9> PP- 98-105; the Bourgeois plan, French text, 
pp. If.03-11, English translation, pp. 23-8-56.
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project was a set of four supplementary agreements 
defining the mandatory system*33
The Council of Ten decided on January 21 that a 
commission to draw up a constitution for a League of na­
tions should be appointed* Wilson suggested that the 
commission be formed of those men who had already studied 
the question* Lloyd G-eorge agreed and at once named Smuts 
and Cecil as the representatives of the British Empire*-^* 
The following day the Coamcil further decided that the 
League of Hations should be created, as an integral part 
of the general treaty of peace.35 This, of course, had, 
been Wilson’s goal for at least a year,3^ and it had also 
been favored by Smuts. 37 On January 25, a plenary session 
of the Conference gave formal approval to the two sugges­
tions adopted earlier in the Council of Ten by agreeing 
that the League of Nations should be created, as an integral
R. S. Bahor, op. cit., I, 225-26. See also 
Miller, Covenant, X, IlO-IlI; Philip Baker, 11 The Making of 
the Covenant from the British Point of View,1* Les Orlgines 
et L 1Oeuvre de la Societe des ITatlons, ed. P. Munch (2 
vols. ; Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, 1923-2)0 ,
II, 33.
Si1 / /IFor* Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, III, 009.
35lbld., III, 677-73.
3°See point fourteen of V/ilson's fourteen points, 
U.S., Congressional Record, 6 5th Cong., 2d Sess., 1913,
LVI, Part 1, 631.
35gee above, pp. 23 and 31. Rappard, Uniting 
Europe, p. 250, said that Smuts "with Wilson did most to 
tie up the League and the peace. '*
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part of the peace treaty, and by appointing a commission 
to draw up a plan for the League.3°
The Commission on the League of Nations was the 
most distinguished of any of the various commassions at 
the Conference. Initially, It was composed of two mem­
bers from each of the five great powers plus one member 
each from Belgium, Brazil, China, Portugal, and Serbia.
The smaller powers, however, asked for more representation 
which was later granted to them by adding to the Commission 
one member each from Poland, Greece, Rumania, and Czecho­
slovakia. President Wilson served as chairman with Colonel 
HoLise as his second; Smuts and Cecil represented the Brit­
ish Empire; Bourgeois was there for Prance and Orlando 
for Italy; Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda represented 
Japan. Other distinguished members we re Hymans of Bel­
gium, Wellington Koo of China, Venizelos of Greece, and 
Dmowski of Poland.39
Although the Commission did not begin to meet until 
February 3j during January, Wilson, House, Cecil, and Smuts 
held many Informal conferences to discuss the League. On
3^For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, III, 201,
203-20!],.
^Seymour, or. cit., IV, 303; Webster and Herbert, 
op. cit., pp. k2-!f_3; P. Baker, op. cit., p. 22, Hiller, 
Covenant, II, 2 6 3. The other members of the Commission 
were Larnaude of Prance, Scialoja of Italy, Pessoa of 
Brazil, Reis of Portugal, Vesnitch of Serbia, Dianandy of 
Rumania, and Kramar of Czechoslovakia.
January 3 1 , after bringing their differences almost to a 
vanishing point, they decided that D. H. Miller and C* J.
B. Hurst, the legal advisors to the delegations from the 
United States and Great Britain, should draw up one final 
draft, representing as nearly as possible what had been 
informally decided upon in the previous weeks. .^0 The 
resulting document, known as the JIurst-MIller draft, 
was vised as the basis for discussion in the meetings of 
the League Commission. Because of the high caliber of the 
British and American delegates and their advance prepara­
tion, nit was Inevitable that the Covenant of the League 
should be mainly an Anglo-Saxon document. Both the 
French and the Italians had presented plans for a League
of Nations, but these were almost completely ignored in
111the discussions of the League Commission. ■
In ten meetings, from February 3 to February 13> 
the Commission hammered out a Covenant of a League of 
Nations for presentation to a plenary session of the 
Conference. It would have been Impossible to have accom-
^Seynour, on. cit., IV, 29lj--957 299~3y0;^R. S. 
Baker, op. cit., I, 232; Miller, Covenant, I, 69-6?; Cecil, 
on. cit.7 pp. 63-69; David Hunter Miller, My Diary at the 
Conforence of Paris (21 vols.; By the author,' 192l6j7~T* 
pp. 101-102. Cited hereafter as Diary.
1, *1
'• Miller, Covenant, II, 231-37.
■^‘‘HYebster and Herbert, on. cit., pp. 33-39*
'"''^ Miller, Covenant, I, 130-32.
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plished such, a task if the basic outlines of the scheme 
had not been agreed upon beforehand.^- Smuts spoke very 
little in these meetings. According to his latest biog­
rapher, !,Iie kept himself deliberately in the background 
so that other people more influential than he was (he 
meant President Wilson) could take the credit for bringing 
the League to birth and thereby feel all the more com­
mitted to making a success of it.11^  Stephen Bonsai, who 
was an American interpreter for the League Commission, 
said: nHis best work was done in committees and in mis­
sionary work with recalcitrant delegates when he could 
play . . .  a ’lone hand.11 ^
Smuts served on a sub-committee which drafted the 
article defining the composition and the powers of the 
Council. '^7 The final text of this article retains much 
the same form that Smuts had originally conceived for it 
in articles 12, 13, and ll.|_ of his Practical Suggestion. 
Smuts also served on the sub-committee which chose Geneva 
as the site for the permanent headquarters of the League.
W'-Pull accounts of all these meetings are in 
Hiller, Covenant, I, 130-271 * II, 230-335*
'■-'^ iancock, on. cit., p. 50? *
^Stephen Bonsai, Unfinished Business ( Garden City, 
Hew York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, I9I4J’-) * P* 3k*
Sec also Seymour, on. cit., IV, 3091 ?* Baker, op. cit., 
p. 25*
^Miller, Diary, I, 110, 35>o*
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The only other city that received serious consideration 
was Brussels, but the members of the sub-committee, which 
included House, Orlando, and Makino, thought it important 
that the League have its headquarters in a neutral country 
if it was to be associated with peace rather than war in 
the minds of the people of the world.^
An example of Smuts1 s missionary work among the 
other delegates has been preserved in as intimate a picture 
of Smuts at work as can be fouind. The Japanese delegates 
on the League of XTations Commission proposed a definite 
racial equality clause and constantly urged its inclusion 
in the League Covenant. The clause was continually watered 
down until it became completely meaningless, but it was a 
matter of “face11 with the Jaioanese. host of the delegates 
on the Commission were personally \7illing to accept the 
statement, but Hughes, the obstreperous Prime Minister of 
Australia, proved the stumbling block. He would hear of 
no clause which might infringe upon Australians long­
standing “whites only11 policy. He threatened to bring the 
whole problem before a plenary session of the Conference 
if any racial equality clause were put in the Covenant, and 
the Japanese threatened to do the sense if it were left out.
1 P'"I* Seymour, op. cit., IV, Ipla; Bonsai, op. cit. , 
p. l6 8  ^ Miller, Covenant, I, );Al. The most thorough 
discussion of the choice of a site for the League head­
quarters is in Happard, Uniting Bur ope, pp. 229-J'i'-*
On March. 2 9 , at House's suggestion, Smuts talked with 
Makino in the presence of Bonsai, who recorded in his 
diary:
This gave me an excellent idea of the style and 
technique of the South African when negotiating on 
delicate ground. He was exceedingly friendly to 
the formal Japanese delegate, but he made quite plain 
what course he would pursue if Makino insisted upon 
bringing the matter before the whole Conference in 
a Plenary Session as it is rumored he proposes
doing.
Smuts told Makino that he would have to fall in line and 
vote with Hughes and the other dominion representatives 
even though he was personally sympathetic to the proposal. 
He left the Japanese delegate with a warm handshake and 
Bonsai drew the conclusion: "Kind words may butter no
parsnips but they certainly softened Makino1s attitude 
toward the white world. In the end the racial equality
clause was not Inserted, and the Japanese swallowed their 
pride and accepted. It, along with Shantung and. the ITorth 
Pacific Islands.^
Although Smuts spoke rarely In the meetings of the 
Commission, when he did speak, it was usually to the point 
and often cleared up some matter that was causing disagree-
^Bonsal, op. cit., p. 1 6 9 . 
5 0 - ,Ibid., pp. 1 6 9-7 0 . See also Seymour, or. cit., 
IV, 3019-1Jl, IlI’l-Ip; Borden, op. cit. , II, 926-23; P. 
Baker, Q'o. cit. , p. 2d.
^Paul Birdsail, Versailles Twenty Years After 
(London: George Allen k Unwin, id!'.!) , pp. 9 1-101.
ment. An example occurred at the third meeting of the 
Commission on February 5* President Wilson proposed that 
only self-governing states and colonies be admitted to 
the League, A lengthy discussion followed as to what the 
term n self-governing11 meant, Wilson himself admitted that 
he had lectured for twenty years on self-governing states 
and still could not define one. Lord Robert Cecil thought 
India should be a member of the League, even though he 
admitted that it was not self-governing, Wilson agreed 
that India should be a member, but indicated that he could 
not reconcile such admission to his proposal. At this 
point Smuts spoke briefly and reminded all that there was 
really no problem. The Covenant, he said, would provide 
that all signers of the treaty were to be members of the 
League, and, since India would sign the treaty, membership 
vj-ould follow automatically. This cleared up the situation 
to the apparent relief of all. A minor Incident, perhaps, 
but It illustrates the clear thinking and sharp Insight 
of Smuts.^
When the first phase of the negotiations on the 
drafting of the Covenant was drawing to a close, Smuts 
attempted to change the proposed constitution of the 
League as it was then developing, even though the ideas
-miillor, Covenant, I, loL-C>7; Seymour, o'o. cit.,
IV, 311-
h.6
h.e had expressed in his Practical Sunrtestion had verr
in—  ■■ i ■ i ii ■■■hi ■ ■ i a iiit’n ri +  fJ
largely been followed. On February 13, at tho ninth, 
meeting of the Commission, he offered an amendment to 
provide for what Hiller called a “Representative Assem­
bly, n in addition to the Council amid Assembly already 
decided upon. He wanted this body to be composed of 
11 representatives chosen out of the legislative assemblies 
or political parties of the states.rT The idea behind this 
suggestion was that, inasmuch as the Assembly would be 
composed of delegates apoointed by the various governments, 
there should be provision made for a representation of the 
people as distinct from their governments. The result 
would be a “leagiie of peoples’1 rather than a “league of 
governments.” Governments were supposed, to be 11 conserva­
tive” whereas the people were “liberal.” This suggestion 
was very vague and hardly in keeping with the practicality 
so frequently displayed by Smuts. Ho other member of the 
Commission favored such a proposal; it was never put to a 
vote, but simply disappeared in the ensuing discussions.-53 
There is no indication in the minutes of the League Com­
mission that Smuts ever pressed this idea very far. In 
his Practical Suggestion he had included the sentence:
“Both the Governments and Parliaments of the states might 
send delegates, and perhaps even parties could be repre-
^3Hillor, Covenant, I, 231, 272-75.
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sented by the selection of members on the principle or 
proportional representation, n5hr but the idea is not em­
bodied in his twenty-one articles. neither did Smuts at 
the Peace Conference or later express any disappointment 
in the way the Covenant was drafted; quite the contrary 
was true. It seems then that Smuts did not really believe 
very strongly in this rather vague and impractical plan*
It Is possible that he introduced it at the insistence of
r-' p'
his liberal following.
The completed Covenant was presented to a plenary
session of the Conference by President Wilson on February
ll. !,A living thing Is born, 11 he said of the document of
o’A
which he was so rightfully p r o u d . I t  was then deposited 
with the Bureau of the Conference for examination and dis­
cussion by all the Interested powers. !To vote on the 
Covenant was taken at that time.^ This draft was 5Ireally 
submitted to the world for comment; and comment came in a
-Miller, Covenant, II, al. Italics mine, 
qg
An indication that this might have been the case 
can be found in Seymour, on. cit. , IV, 313•
For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, III, 212. 
Sir Robert Borden was disappointed in Wilson’s speech. Ee 
wrote: ,?Wilson should have expressed appreciation of
General Smuts’ work upon which the proposals reported were 
very largely based; as a matter of fact the only concrete 
proposals placed before the Committee emanated from the 
British Delegation. 11 Borden, op. cit. , II, 913*
37Dor. Reis, of 13*3* , Peace Conference, III, 230.
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flood of criticism and suggestion of all kinds and from 
all quarters, friendly and hostile, important and unim­
portant. ”5^
President Wilson was away from Paris from February 
ik to March lk. When he returned, the Covenant was re­
drafted in the light of the suggestions received. Smuts 
contributed nothing significant to this phase of the 
drafting* In fact, he was absent from three of the five
meetings held in March and April; on the two occasions
when he was present, he did not enter into the discussions.59 
The final draft of the Covenant was presented to 
a plenary session of the Conference on April 23; President
YiTilson again presided. In the voting which followed, the
60Covenant was accepted unanimously. After the meeting,
Smuts joined House and Bonsai, who recorded Smuts1s reac­
tions on that historic occasion:
The Afrikander was torn with doubts as to the jus­
tice and even the efficacy of the Treaty in its
present incomplete form. For several weeks now
hardly a day had passed without a suggestion of 
changes coming from him. He seemed very tired.
Certainly he was not sharing the exultant mood 
that shone on the faces of at least a majority 
of the delegates. He shrugged his shoulders in 
answer to an unspoken inquiry from the Colonel 
and then, r,The Peace Treaty may fade Into oblivion-- 
and- that would be, I sometimes think, a merciful
^Miller, Covenant, I, 2 7 6 . 
g9 Ibid., I, 336-53, !|-39-52.
R e i s ,  of U.S., Peace Conference, III, 3lk«
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dispensation of a kind Providence— but the Covenant 
will stand--as sure as fate. It nust and snail suc­
ceed because there Is no.other way to salvage the 
fixture of civilization."^
Of his own role In the founding of tho League of
Nations Smuts said:
"All else I have done in my lifetime is as nothing 
and as dust and ashes compared with the small ef­
fort I have been able to contribute towards the
building up of this new organization for the future 
government of the world, "62-
Smuts continued to believe in the League of Nations 
throughout his long life. He even wove It into the sys­
tem of philosophy which he set forth In a book published 
seven years after the Peace Conference, He wrote:
The creation of wholes, and ever more highly organized 
vfholes, and of wholeness generally as characteristic 
of existence, Is an Inherent character of the universe. 
♦ . . Holism is not confined to the biological domain
but reaches its highest expressions and results on the
mental and spiritual planes of existence.
Thus the League of Nations, the chief constructive 
outcome of the G-reat War, Is but the expression of the 
deeply-felt aspiration towards a more stable holistic 
human society. And the faith has been strengthened 
in me that what has here been called Holism Is at work 
even In the conflicts and confusions of men; that in 
spite of all appearances to the contrary, eventual 
victory Is serenely and securely waiting, and that the 
Immeasurable sacrifices have not been in vain.^3
6>1 iBonsai, op. cit., p. 21J
/
°%IIllIn, op. cit., II, 30. 
o 3J an Chr i s 11 an Smu t s , Holism and Evolution (IT e w 
York: The Llacmillan Co., 19 2o) , pp~.~ 99, Smuts
c o i n e d  the word "holism" from the G-reck word for whole.
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Smuts did not lose his faith even vr on a second 
world war seemingly killed the League. When the repre­
sentatives of fifty nations met in San Francisco in 19l'-5> 
to draft another constitution for another international 
organization, which they hoped would be better than the 
first, Smuts was again among the delegates. As an elder 
statesman he was appointed president of the General 
Assembly, one of the four major commissions at the Con­
ference. He was also largely responsible for the wording 
of the preamble to the United Hations Charter. "The 
charter itself was a cold legalistic document, but the 
preamble was a warmer human document which set out plainly 
world hopes and aspirations. By it, perhaps more than
/ 1
anything else, the charter will, one day be remembered. 11 ^
In San Francisco the League which Smuts helped to form 
in 1919 was reborn and lives today in the United Hations.  ^
If the United Nations, or some succeeding organisation of 
states in some future age, eventually brings about per­
petual peace on this globo, Jan Christian Smuts of South 
Africa will rank among those whose vision made that peace 
possible.
^ LSnuts, Jr., op. cit. , p. 3^7 •
0^Walters, 0 0 . cit., II, oll-lp-
CHAPTER IV
SMUTS AHD THE LIAHDATES SYSTEM
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Ra­
tions provided for a system of mandates for administering 
the former German colonies and certa.in parts of the de­
funct Turkish Empire# General Smuts played a leading role 
in the creation of this system. In his pamphlet on the 
League of Rations, Smuts devoted articles 2 through 9, or 
about one-third of the total work, to the exposition of 
his Idea that the League of Rations should become the 
11reversionary In the most general sense11 of the npeoples 
and territories formerly belonging to Russia, Austria- 
Hungary, and Turkey# 11 The administration of these terri­
tories, Smuts believed, should be the exclusive function 
of the League of Rations# He rejected, however, direct 
exercise of that control by the League because he believed 
such International control had never worked In the past.
He suggested Instead that the League appoint one of its 
members as its agent or nmandataryr3 for each of the terri­
tories under its control# He further suggested that the 
League set forth in a special act or charter for each man­
dated. territory the policy which the League expected the 
mand.atary to follow in that territory. Although the char­
ters would vary according to the state of development of 
the territory and. Its people, they would all contain certa
52
basic provisions, such as the maintenance of the open door 
policy in economic matters and the restriction of military 
forces to those necessary for internal security* Further­
more, Smuts believed that the mandated territory should 
have the right of appeal to the League in case the manda­
tary abused, its responsibilities* The League, in such 
cases, should have the power to remove the controlling 
state and replace it by another. Also, each mandatary 
should furnish periodic reports to the League with respect 
to the territory under its supervision.
A comparison of Smuts1s ideas, as expressed in his 
Practical Suggestion, with Article 22 of the Covenant will 
show many similarities. The greatest difference is in the 
territories to which Article 22 applied.* Hone of the for­
mer Russian and Austro-Hungarian territories were ever 
administered under the League of nations. On the other 
hand, the former German colonies in Africa and in the 
Pacific were included as mandates even though Smuts had 
specifically excluded these areas because they were in­
habited by barbarians, who not only cannot possibly govern 
themselves, but to whom it would be impracticable to apply 
any idea of political self-determination in the European
"Sillier, Covenant, II, 2o-3 7 . Smuts used the 
swelling "mandatary,u~but in the English language text 
of the Covenant the spelling “mandatory" was adopted.
Q
sense. 11 This difference was due almost entirely to Presi­
dent 7/i Is on*
It has been shown above^ that Wilson was much in- 
pros sod by Smutsfs pamphlet, and that he revised his own 
plan after seeing It* The draft he brought from America 
did not include anything comparable to Smuts1s mandates 
system#^ The three drafts which he prepared after arriving 
In Europe, however, all contained, In a number of supple­
mentary agreements, a plan for a system of mandates, which, 
he took over from SmutsTs pamphlet* From the first, Wilson 
Included the German colonies and excluded any mention of 
Russia In his suggestions, and in his last draft he men­
tioned only the German colonies and certain former Turkish 
territories* These were the territories that eventually 
were included under Article 22. ^
It must not be supnosed that the idea of a mandates 
plan was entirely new to Wilson when he saw it in Smuts*s 
pamphlet. In fact, on December 10, 1913, while on route to 
Eurooe on the George Washington, Wilson said to some of his
-■ ■■ !— !.— » ■ ■ ■ »  ■' ■■■■ IP I I II I-' >1W I ■ I ■■
advisors that nthe German colonles should be declared the
^Miller, Covenant, II, 28.
^Chapter III, pp. 37-39.
I,
“Hiller, C oven ant, II, Document 3, pp. 12-lp.
i—f
^Ibid* , II, Document 7> PP» 65-93; Document 9 * D’1* 
93-105; Document ik, pp. lk5“5>k. See also ibid * , I, 101-102 
R. S. Baker, op. cit *, I, 226.
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common property of the League of Rations and administered 
by small nations. Also, the official commentary on 
Wilson1s fourteen points, prepared under the direction of 
Colonel House and accepted by Wilson, suggested something 
like the mandatory scheme, a.1 though the word itself was 
not used.'*7 At least two writers have suggested that, prior 
to his seeing Smuts*s pamphlet, Wilson had not thought of 
Incorporating his ideas on the colonial settlement Into the 
League of Rations Covenant, but had thought of that settle­
ment as a matter to be dealt with prior to and apart from 
the League of Rations.^ One of these writers credited 
Smuts with having much the same Idea concerning the settle­
ment of the colonial claims, which accounts for his not 
mentioning the German colonies in his discussion of his 
mandates proposal.^
Smuts, of course, had very definite views on the 
disposition of the German colonies. He and Botha had. con­
quered German South West Africa and they meant to keep it. 
They also hoped to exchange part of German hast Africa,
^Miller, Covenant, I, lp3* Italics in original.
Seymour, op. cit., IV, 156.
^R. S. Baker, op. cit., I, 2o5; Pittman B. Potter, 
"Origin of the System of Mandates under the League of Ra­
tions, 11 American Political Science Review, XVI (Hovenbcr,
1 9 2 2), 5 W .
^Ibid., p. 5 7 6 .
which Smuts had conquered, for Delogoa Bay in Portuguese 
East A f r i c a , S m u t s  expected Great Britain to keep the 
rest of German East Africa* Under no circumstances was 
Germany to be allowed to keep that strategically located 
colony. 3-3-
One of the few things upon which the Allies were 
in complete agreement at the Peace Conferonce was that 
none of Germany*s former colonies were to be returned to 
her* Such had been the decision of the Imperial War Cabi­
net late in 1 9 1 3 .3-2 Such also was the unanimous decision 
of the Council of Ten on January 2k, 1919;^ almost no 
discussion was needed to arrive at that decision. What 
should be done with the German colonies was not decided 
so easily* In fact, that problem proved to be the first 
major controversy of the Conference. The dominion repre­
sentatives in the Imperial War Cabinet had supported the 
claims of South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand to the 
colonies which their respective armies had conquered.^ 
Lloyd George was perfectly v/Illing to abide by their
^Hancock, op * cit*, p. 1l37 •
Jan Christian Smuts, "East Africa,rT The Century, 
XCVI (July, 1913), 309-13.
^■^Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, llp-lG.
3-3pop# Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, III, 713.
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decision, but, before the matter was settled, it came up 
against the strong opposition of Wilson.
The Council of Ten spent the week of January 2h. 
to January 30 discussing the problem of the German colonies. 
At the first of these meetings Smuts put in a claim for 
South West Africa on behalf of the Union of South Africa; 
Prime Minister Massey claimed German Samoa on behalf of 
New Zealand; and Prime Minister Hughes asked for German 
Hew Guinea on behalf of Australia. These men based their 
requests not only upon the fact that their respective 
armies had conquered the territor5.es in question but also 
upon the fact that the territories v/ere of strategic im­
portance to their future security. They did not want a 
repetition of the threat that had been inherent in the
German possession of these lands. -^5 In subsequent meetings
1 f
the Japanese claimed the North Pacific islands, and, the 
French claimed Togoland and the Cameroons.^-^ Against all 
these claims Wilson fought persistently, but alone. He 
advocated instead the mandates plan of Smuts as modified 
by himself* When pressed closely, however, he admitted 
that there was little administrative difference between





his idea of a mandate and outright annexation."^ Lloyd 
George was willing to accept the mandatory scheme on be­
half of Great Britain, but he could not speak for the 
dominion representatives, nor could he persuade them to 
accept it.
Meanwhile, Smuts had been busy behind the scenes 
trying to effect a compromise acceptable to both Wilson 
and the dominion representatives. On January 29, Miller 
and House both saw a draft of a compromise resolution 
prepared by Smut s. 3*9 Later that day, in a meeting of the 
British Empire delegation, the dominion representatives 
were persuaded to accept the Smuts resolution,^ This 
resolution provided that the former German colonies and 
parts of the Turkish Empire should be administered as 
mandates under the League of Hations. The compromise 
worked out by Smuts divided the mandates into three classe 
The first class applied to the former Turkish possessions 
which were almost ready to stand alone. The second class 
applied to the territories of central Africa where the
'^JFor. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, III,
7IlO-L3.
^Miller, Diary, I, 9 6 ; Seymour, op. cit., IV,
2 9O. According to J. R. M. Biitler, Lord Lothian (London: 
Macmillan & Co., i9 6 0 ), p. 75* Philip Herr, Lloyd George1s 
private secretary, helped Smuts draft this resolution.




• • • are at such a stage that the mandatory must 
be responsible Tor the administration of the terri­
tory subject to conditions which will guarantee the 
prohibition of abuses such as the slave tra.de, the 
arms traffic and the liquor traffic and the preven­
tion of the military training of the natives for 
other than police purposes, and the establishment 
of fortifications or military and naval bases, and 
will also secure equal opportunities for the trade 
and commerce of other members of the League of ra­
tions .
The third class applied to those
. . . territories, such as South-West Africa and
certain of the Islands in the South Pacific, which, 
owing to the sparseness of their population, or 
their small size, or their remoteness from the cen­
tres of civilization, or their geographical conti­
guity to the mandatory state, and other circumstances, 
can be best administered under the laws of the man­
datory sta.te as integral portions thereof, subject 
to the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests 
of the indigenous population.^-
On January 30, after a lengthy and heated discussion, the
Council of Ten adopted the Smuts resolution, Hughes and
Massey made it clear that they still preferred outright
annexation, but, in order not to hold up the entire Peace
Conference, they would accept the compromise if the clause
p p
providing for the third, class of mandates remained intact.
In the week of discussions which led to the accept­
ance of the mandates principle, the mandates themselves
^ Miller, Covenant, I, 109-110. Lloyd George, 
poace Treaties, I, "53'3-IlI,' prints this resolution but 
says nothing of Smuts’s role In preparing it.
22For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, III,
735-317.
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were not specifically distributed. This was not done until 
May 7 and not until 1920 in the case of the Turkish terri­
tories. nevertheless, the ultimate distribution of the 
mandates was understood by everyone present. The dominion 
representatives would not have agreed to the solution un­
less they had known that they were to receive the terri­
tories they desired as T,CT* mandates. ITor would Clemenceau 
have agreed to the mandates principle without the tacit 
understanding that France was to receive certain mandates 
In central A f r i c a . ^3
The Commission on the League of nations considered 
the question of mandates on February 3. When the mandates 
article of the Hurst-MIller draft was read, General Smuts 
presented as a substitute a resolution almost identical to 
the one accepted by the Council of Ten 011 January 30*
Bonsai recorded the scene:
This was a field day or rather night at the 
Peace table, and for once General Smuts, as chair­
man of the committee charged with the difficult 
task of drawing up the mandate provisions of the 
Covenant, held the center of the stage, and the 
general opinion is, Including the President1s, that 
he performed his job SLiperbly.
Blushing profusely, the South African opened his 
speech of explanation and apology In a very modest 
strain. And If this was tactics it was very wise.
T*It is true,iT he began, 11 that I present this 
article to your careful and, I hope, prayerful 
consideration, with some misgiving, because I would 
be less than frank If I did not tell you that I an
23]vliller, Covenant, I, llk-15.
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ashamed of it; and* as I have abundant reason to 
know, all the gentlemen v/ho worked with me upon it* 
each and every one of them* are also disappointed 
at the result of our labors. But do not misunder­
stand me; distressing to our pride as is this con­
fession and. falling far short* as does our plan, of 
the objective which we hoped to attain* the article 
that we place before you is the best we can do now. 
In this belief we are all united.
f,If you give your sanction to our work you will 
demonstrate that world public opinion is in favor 
of the ultimate self-government of all peoples, 
without distinction as to race* religion* or color* 
or previous condition of servitude. It also pro­
vides for a careful supervision and scrutiny as to 
the way in which the mandates are exercised and how 
the officers v/ho shall be responsible for this great 
task are to be appointed.
"Now I shall close on a word of warning* based 
on the knowledge which has come to me as the result 
of many a long, weary, and at times bitter discussion 
in the committee. You will see many things you would 
like to change— just as I do* but I beg of you if our 
plan is pointed in the right direction, let it stand. 
It is not as responsive to your Ideals* or to mine, 
as we had all hoped to make it* but hold your hand* 
restrain your natural disappointment* for If our edi­
fice, poor as it is* Is touched, I firmly believe It 
will fall to the ground* not to be raised again I 
fear In your day and mine. 51
Smuts*s manly confession and frank warning against 
permitting the Committee battles to be fought over 
again in the Commission won out* and the mandate pro­
visions on both the first and second readings were 
accepted* rather than approved without any substantial 
changes. . . .
It was a great triumph for Smuts* and the Presi­
dent quite visibly was pleased.
Of course, the best argument for not tampering with the
article presented by Smuts was that It had already been
accepted by the Supreme Council of the Conference as had
^'‘Bonaal* op. cit. * pp. See also killer,
Covenant, II, 275*
no other article of the Covenant. From this meeting on 
February 8 until its final incorporation In the Covenant 
and the treaty, the mandates article changed scarcely at 
all.
Although Smuts was the first to suggest a system 
of mandates under the League of Nations and was also the 
chief author of Article 22 of the Covenant* It must not 
be supposed that the idea was entirely a product of his 
own creative brain. He had received inspiration from 
many sources--the chief of them being the British Empire. 
He explained in his Practical Suggestion that the United 
Kingdom, the dominions, and India were like the members 
of a League of nations, whereas the minor parts of the 
Empire, such as the crown colonies and protectorates, 
were like the mandates. He believed that "where the 
British Empire has been so eminently successful as a 
political system, the league, working on somewhat similar 
lines, could, not fail to achieve a reasonable measure of 
success.1'2^ R. S. Baker suggested that Smuts borrowed the 
mandate idea from the Inter-Allled Labour and Socialist 
program of February I9 I8 . This program set ou.t a scheme 
for a League of Nations and for the administration of 
Armenia, Llesopotamla, and Arabia, as well as the colonies
p r'
Sillier, Covenant, II, 37-
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of tropical Africa, under League supervision. ^ 0 Further­
more, Smuts was influenced by the Round Table group, 
which included such men as Philip Kerr, Lionel Curtis,
F. S. Oliver, and Lord Robert Cecil. ^  Smuts frequently 
met Kerr during the war years and could easily have re­
ceived ideas from him and from the others of the group
oo
through him. ^
George Louis Beer of the United States may also 
have influenced Smuts*s ideas on the mandates system.
In the years before the war, Beer had spent much time In 
London where he too became acquainted with the Round Table 
group and became the American correspondent for Its maga­
zine. ^ 9 He was later appointed the colonial expert of 
Colonel House* s Inquiry. In his report 011 Mesopotamia 
for the Inquiry, finished January 1, 1913* Beer suggested 
that backward regions be entrusted "by International man­
date" to one state subject to safeguards for the natives. 30
26R. S. Baker, op. cit., I, 227, Temperley, 
op. cit., I, 217.
27
Potter, op ♦ cit. , p. 5t>3s Temperley, op. cit.,
VI, 501; David Hunter Miller, "The Making of the League 
of Nations, 11 House and Seymour, op. cit. , p. Ll03.
^Butler, op. cit., p. 6 5 .
^George Louis Beer, African questions at the Paris 
Peace Conference, ed, Louis Herbert Gray (Hew York: Mac-
millan and Company, 1 9 2 3), p. xvii.
3°Ibxd., p. hrZh,.
°3
The editor of Beer’s papers said that this was the first 
use of the word ’’mandate" in the sense in which it came 
to be used in the League of nations Covenant,^ Another 
paper prepared, by Beer, probably between January 1 and 21, 
1 9 1 9 9 ^^ contained in summary form recommendations for the 
disposition of the former G-erman colonies. Beer’s memo­
randum read:
The administration of the derelict territories and 
peoples freed from G-erman and Turkish rule must, in 
general, be entrusted to different states acting as 
mandatories of the League of nations. These mandates 
cannot, however, be uniform, but must vary with the 
circumstances of the different c a s e s , 33
As this was a private memorandum for the use of the American 
negotiators, Smuts certainly did not see it, but the ideas 
contained therein may have reached him through some member 
of the Round Table group either before the publication of 
his original plan, or at least before his preparation of 
the resolution adopted by the Council of Ten on January 3d, 
Of course, it is equally possible that it was Smuts who 
influenced Beer, It is Interesting to note that Beer recom­
mended that German South West Africa bo incorporated Into 
the Union of South Africa and that German Hew Guinea be 
added to the Australian section of Hew Guinea, In Beer’s
3^-Boer, op, cit., p. xix.
IPJames T. Shot we 11, At the Paris Peace Conference 
(Hew York: Macmillan Co., 1937TjJ PP. lOl-lOP, 133-3'
■^Beer, op. cit., pp. 1i_31-32«
opinion, the mandatory principle uas !,not advisable and 
would serve no useful purpose11 in either of these terri­
tories.
It seems clear from the above that Smuts played a 
major role In the creation of the mandates system. To 
evaluate that role, it is necessary to evaluate the system.
At first there were a good many men who d.efinitely did not 
like the idea of mandates. Secretary of State Robert Lan­
sing thought it was too revolutionary* it left unsolved 
too many legal questions concerning sovereignty. Further­
more, It was a way to take enemy territory without appearing 
to d.o so; it was just a 11 subterfuge which deceived no one.n35 
An American scholar, writing in 1<}21, held, a similar opinion* 
Ke said that the mandatory scheme was adopted by European 
statesmen as a scheme to disguise under a cloak of nvirtuous 
self-abnegation11 their annexations of German property. ^ 0 
A noted British colonial administrator, writing In 1923, 
said that at one time he and many others had thought that 
a more effective way could have been found to settle the 
colonial question, but he now thought that, In view of the 
difficu.lt situation facing the Allies at the Peace Confer-
'"Boer, 0 0 . cit., p;. '><-57-53.
o q ,
"^Lansing, Peace Negotiations, pp. 3a, lf>o*
■^Herbert Adams Gibbons, "The Defects of the System 
of Llandates," Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science , XCVT T^uly, 192T5T"37i--90.
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ence, the mandates system offered the best possible solu­
tion. 67 Herbert Hoover did not like the idea in 1919 and 
apparently never changed his opinion. He wrote in 1956:
General Smuts1 formula, thus introduced in the 
Covenant, was one of the most monumental attainments 
in the history of Old World diplomacy. . . .
Ho one since has been able to find any practical 
difference between these mandated areas and the other 
British, French, Italian or Japanese colonies or
imperial possessions.36
In his last statement Hoover was certainly wrong, 
for many opinions can be found in favor of the system. As 
early as 1 9 2 5 it was said that the mandates system was not 
the veiled, form of annexation claimed by its critics but a 
symbol of a new and progressive imperialism; the system 
had. surpassed all former attempts at international control 
over colonies.39 Birdsall wrote that Wilson made great 
concessions when he accepted Smuts1 s compromise, '*but It 
was an accomplishment to have extracted an unwilling assent 
to the universality of the trusteeship principle . . . and
to have endowed the League of nations with rights of 
supervision."^ A very cautious American scholar said that
■^Frederick D. Lugard, "The mandates System, 11 
Edinburg Review, CCXXXVIII (October, 1923), 39§-ko3.
33jloover, op. cit., p. 2 2k.
39Walter Russell Batsell, 11 Summary of the Work of 
the Sessions of the Permanent Mandates Commission,u Inter­
national Conciliation, Ho. 213 (October, 1925), 50-5l»
^Birdsall, op. cit., pp. 73-7*!-*
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the system had proved a practical method Tor administering 
backward areas, more satisfactory than others that had 
been tried from the standpoint of the natives and the world 
in general. He observed that British methods in the man­
dated Tanganyika were preferable to those in Kenya, and 
French methods in Togoland and the Cameroons were better 
than those in French West and Equatorial Africa. He fur­
ther observed that the system had developed policies 
favorable to native health, agriculture, education, and 
security.^- Miller1s opinion was:
Even in the 11C” mandates . . . the principle
of trusteeship is firmly establishedi. . . . And
as to the other territories in Africa and those 
formerly in Turkey, the world took a very long 
step forwarji when Article 22 of the Covenant came 
into* force .8-2
Professor Rappard, who served for many years as a member 
of the permanent Mandates Cora-mission of the League of na­
tions, wrote in 19^ -6 that, except for the Japanese man­
date, the mandates system was the most successful of the 
various innovations introduced into the law and practice 
of nations by the League. *^3
), *]
Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Ila- 
tions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930),
i W T 31, 567.
] | p
"' “Miller, Covenant, I, 103*
I ^^ iYilliam E. Rappard, "The Mandates and the Inter­
national Trusteeship Systems," Political Science Quarterly, 
LXI (September, 19I4.0 ), I4.O8-I9 .
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Further proof that the system was not just the old 
imperialism camouflaged was that by 19 6 2 all of the IfA rf 
and TtB" mandates had become independent states. The worst 
failure of the system was Japan1 s use of its flG" mandated 
North Pacific islands as bases for aggression against the 
United States in I9I4-I. The other failure was in Smuts *s 
own South Africa. The Union, in 1 9 6 2, still held South 
West Africa and had virtually incorporated it into its 
own t erritory. kh-
Vu““‘Kenneth Bradley (ed.), The Living Commonwealth 
(London: Hutchinson Cz Co., 1961)7 pY I1 6 0Y
CHAPTER V
SMUTS AITD REPARATIONS
When the war ended in November I9IS, much of Prance 
and Belgium lay in ruins. The Allies had expended unprece­
dented sums to defeat the Central Powers a.nd now staggered 
under the burden of tremendous public debts. A large per­
centage of the merchant shipping of the world had been des­
troyed by Germany1s unrestricted use of submarine warfare. 
The total wealth expended in prosecuting the war was almost 
unbelievable to the people of that day, but the human misery 
caused by the war was even greater than the material damage. 
Millions of young men had been killed and millions more had 
been crippled for life. As a further consequence of the 
war, there were thousands upon thousands of widows and or­
phans who had to be partly or wholly supported by their 
governments. The question naturally arose: who Is going
to pay for all this death and destruction? The answer as 
naturally given was: Germany. In the view of the Allies,
Germany alone was responsible for the xvar.-^  All the suf­
fering and destruction had been caused by Germany*s unpro­
voked attack upon helpless Belgium and then upon France.
■^R. B. lucCallum, Public Opinion and the Last^Peace 
(London: Oxford University Press, T^ TjlyTi p 0 . lOk-105".
Tardieu, op. cit., pp. 1-26, rehearsed German militarism 
as far back as iBfi.B. He had no doubt of Germany* s war 
guilt.
How much Germany should pay, how much she could, pay, and 
how these payments should be divided among the Allies were 
subjects which demanded a tremendous amount of study and 
debate at the Peace Conference. Indeed, r,the subject of 
reparations caused more trouble, contention, hard feeling 
and delay at the Peace Conference than any other point of 
the Treaty of Versailles.,f^  Although General Smuts was 
not assigned to the Reparations Commission of the Confer­
ence, he exerted an important influence on the final claims 
presented to Germany. To understand that influence, the 
development of the reparations clauses of the treaty must 
be at least partially traced.
The Idea of demanding reparations from s. defeated 
enemy was not invented at Paris In 1919a it is as old. as 
war itself. Whereas reparations were once collected by 
means of loot and pillage and the annexation of conquered 
territory, by.the nineteenth century, a money payment was 
usually demanded of the vanquished by the victor. The most 
recent example before the negotiators of 1919 v/as Prussia1 s 
exaction of an indemnity from Prance In 1 8 7 1 which far ex- 
the total cost of the Franco-Prussian w a r . 3 From the 
earliest days of the 19l)j--19l3 war, both the Allies and
Q
Thomas William Lamont, Reparations,:I House and 
Seymour, op. cit., P. 259•
3hloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, )i39*
the Central Powers had thought of reparations as part of 
any final settlement. The German Chancellor Bethmann- 
Hollweg admitted, in a speech in the Reichstag on August 
I}., 191^ !-, that Germany had wronged Belgium and stated that 
the Imperial government would seek to make good that wrong 
as soon as Germany1s military objectives had been attained.1 
A few months later, Prime Minister Herbert Asquith promised 
that Great Britain would never u * sheathe the sword . . . 
until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than 
all that she has sacrificed.' As the war continued and 
damage and destruction mounted, two distinct attitudes de­
veloped among the Allies with regard to how much Germany 
was to pay in the event of an Allied victory. The French 
were In the forefront of those who thought Germany should 
pay for the entire costs of the war. On the other hand, 
President Wilson led the Americans In advocating that 
Germany should pay only for material damage caused by the 
war.^
When the Germans began negotiating for an armis­
tice in October 1 9 1 8, they specifically accepted as a
-^'Philip Mason Burnett, Reparation at the Paris 
Peace Conference from the Standpoint of the American 
Del e gat ion (2 vo'ls. ; Hew~York; Columbia University 
Press, 19^0) , I, 35k-*
^Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, J±1]D.
^R. S. Baker, op. cit., II, 368-69.
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basis fop peace negotiations Wilson* s fourteen pointsj 
given in an address to Congress on January 3, 1913, and 
bis subsequent speeches, especially the one of September 
27, 1 9 1 6 .' The only references to reparations in Wilson*s 
fourteen points were the statements in points VII, VIII, 
and XI that Belgium, France, Rumania, Serbia, and Monte­
negro should be 11 evacuated and restored.11^ The following 
month Wilson added his famous statement: ” There shall be
no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages,”9 
These then Yiere Wilson*s rather vague and somewhat contra­
dictory pronouncements on reparations which the Germans 
wished to accept as the basis of a peace settlement. It 
was necessary, of course, for all the Allies to agree to 
this basis before the negotiations for an armistice could 
proceed. Accordingly, representatives of the Allied and 
Associated Powers met In Paris on October 2 9 , 1913* There 
they agreed to accept the fourteen points provided that 
the reparations statements were clarified.-^ Therefore,
^Burnett, op. cit., I, 330-81; U.S., Department of 
State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1 9 1 3 ^i^T^ment' 1 (2 vols.j Washington: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1933), I, 337-33. Cited 
hereafter as For. Reis, of U.S., 1913, Supp. 1.
Q
U.S., Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 2d Sess,, 
1913, LVI, Part 1, 681.
9u.S., Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 2d Sess., 
1913, LVI, Part 2'/1 9 3 7 1 9 5 2 “. -
^Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, jhr-3$.
72
when the final note of November 5>, the Lansing ITote, was 
communicated to Germany, it contained the following state-
Further, in the conditions of peace laid down 
in his address to Congress of January 8 , 1913, the 
President declared that invaded territories must 
be restored as well as evacuated and freed, the 
Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be 
allowed to exist as to what this provision implies.
By it they understand that compensation will be 
made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian 
population of the Allies and their property by the 
aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from 
the air.-^-
The above statement made by the Allies and accepted 
by Germany thus constituted the basis for the reparation 
discussions at the Peace Conference. Note that it was 
restricted to damage to the civilian population only. 
Nevertheless, between the Armistice and the Conference, 
French public opinion and the French press continued their 
demands for total reparation of war costs. The French 
Parliament hesitated to pass tax bills in the hope that 
payments from Germany would balance the French budget.-*-^
In Great Britain Lloyd George called for a general elec­
tion in December 1913 in order to obtain a "mandate” from 
the people for making the peace.-**3 in the election
ment:
See
1 2Ibid., I, 9.
^Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, 157-59
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campaign, the Prime Minister was careful to point out that 
reparations would have to be limited by Germany1s capacity 
to pay, vdaich would certainly be less than the public was 
hoping for. On the other hand, other campaigners were not 
so careful, and British public opinion was certainly aroused 
to hope that their own tax burdens would be eased by a 
heavy contribution from G e r m a n y . I n  contrast to public 
opinion In Prance and Great Britain, there was never any 
demand for a large indemnity in the United States, which 
had suffered but slightly In comparison with the European 
A l l i e s . W i t h  such various public opinions influencing 
the delegates, it was Inevitable that a clash on repara­
tions would occur at the Conference.
At the plenary session of January 25 a Commission
on the Reparation of Damage was appointed. It was instructed
to examine and report on how much the enemy countries ought
to pay in reparations, on what they were capable of paying,
1 Aand on how and when payment should be made. The first
1!
oLloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, I162-6 9 . See 
also ITicolson, op. cit. , pp. 19-2IT* Tillman, op. cit., 
pp. 62-65; BIrdsall, op. cit. 9 pp. 3 6-b.O. Keynes, op. cit. > 
pp. 136-L.5? wrote a lurid account of this election. It 
naturally made a deeper Impression than the more conser­
vative accounts of others.
15^Burnett, op. cit., I, 13#
For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, III, 202, 
205-206. The American delegates on the Reparations Com­
mission were Bernard M. Baruch, I'Tornan H. Davis, Vance C. 
McCormick, and later Thomas 7I. Lamont, with John Foster
task of the Commission, which began to meet on February 5, 
was to decide on the general principles to be followed in 
demanding reparations from the defeated enemy. To this 
end each delegation was asked to file a statement of prin­
ciple s. 17 When the statements were compared, it was found 
that every delegation except that of the United States 
believed that Germany should pay for the entire cost of 
the war.l^
The first major debate in the Commission then be­
gan over the inclusion of war costs. The American delega­
tion, often through it s brilliant young legal advisor,
John Foster-Dulles, argued that the wording of the Lan­
sing note accepted by both Germany and the Allies could 
not possibly be construed to cover remuneration for war 
costs.^ On the other hand, the argument for including
Dulles as legal advisor. The French delegates were Louis- 
Lucien Klotz, Albert-Francois Lebrun, and Louis Loucheur. 
Great Britain was represented by Prime Minister William 
M. Hughes of Australia, Lord Cunliffe, and Lord Sumner.
(In spite of Lloyd George's protestations of moderation, 
he appointed to the Reparations Commission men whom he 
knew were in favor of exacting a large sum from Germany.) 
Other states represented on the Commission were Belgium, 
Greece, Poland, Portugal, Italy, Japan, Rumania, Serbia, 
and Czechoslovakia. Burnett, op. cit., I, 13, II, 230-31.
17Bernard M. Baruch, The Making of the Reparation 
and Economic Sections of the Treaty (hew York: Ilarper £:
Brothers', 1920)', p7 TcT. Cited hereafter as Reparation.
"^Burnett, op. cit., I, 20, II, 313-17*
^Ibid. , I, 3*70-75; Baruch, Reparation, p. 20.
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such, costs was advanced vigorously by the British delegation. 
This was a natural position for the British to take, for if 
reparation was limited to physical damage only, the continen­
tal countries would receive the lionTs share, whereas Britain 
and the dominions would receive almost n o t h i n g . ^ 0 France, 
Italy, Serbia, and Japan followed the British lead.^* Only 
Belgium argued that to demand a large total from an emeny 
unable to pay it all would reduce proportionately the claims 
of those countries which had suffered the most material dam­
age. Thus Belgium was for excluding war costs, that is, 
for all other countries. Belgium* s right to reparation for 
such costs had been recognized, by the Allies because the 
invasion of Belgium had been a breach of international law.^
After weeks of argument it became clear that the 
delegates on the Reparations Commission were never going to 
come to a decision by themselves. It v/as decided., there­
fore, to refer the matter to the Supreme Council. At that 
time President Wilson was en route to the United States, 
so a long message was dispatched to him explaining the di­
lemma and asking his advice. The President sent back his
20Baruch, Reparation, pn. 20-21; Burnett, op. cit.,
X, 553-57.
21rbid., I, 5 3 9-9 1 , IX, 330-31; Baruch, Reparation,
pp. 3 1 U - 2 2 .
^Burnett, op. cit., II, 32k-26; For. Reis, of U.S., 
1913, Supp. 1, I, k09; Seymour, op. cit., IV, 196'.
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approval of the stand of the American delegation, saying 
in part that the inclusion of war costs nis clearly incon­
sistent with, what we deliberately led the enemy to expect 
and cannot now honorably alter simply because we have the 
p o w e r ." With WilsonTs support the American delegates in 
informal conferences were able to persuade Lloyd George, 
Clemenceau, and Orlando to accept the American point of 
view on the exclusion of war costs.^* It must be said, 
however, that it was not Wilson*s stand alone that decided 
the issue. The French delegates soon realized, as had the 
Belgians earlier, that the exclusion of war costs was to 
the advantage of France if Germany could not pay all that 
was morally her duty to pay.^ Another significant factor 
was the concession on theoretical responsibility advanced 
by Dulles. He suggested that a clause be Inserted in the 
treaty saying that Germany was in principle liable for the 
whole cost of the war, but, due to her inability to pay it 
all, a lesser amount would be demanded. This became Article 
231, the "war guiltIT clause of the Versailles Treaty, which
^Burnett, op. cit., I, 6lk.
^Baruch, Reparation, p. 26.
^Burnett, op. cit., I, 2^-26; Tardieu, 0 0 . cit., 
pp. 291-92. With war costs Included France would he.ve re­
ceived 2l_ip, the British Empire, kO/S, Belgium, 1.7p, and the 
United States, 2S% of the total reparations. With war costs 
excluded the percentages would have been France, l'-3L, the 
British Empire, 19u* Belgium, 2h$, and the United States, 
less than 1%. Baruch, Reparation, pp. 21-22.
was so hated by the Germans and so exploited by Hitler.
The next major debate in the Reparations Commission 
was over the categories of reparation to be demanded from 
(Germany. Each delegation submitted a memorandum on the 
subject to a special sub-committee of the Commission. The 
memoranda were then consolidated into one list of thirty- 
one categories, which were gradually reduced to ten. On 
these ten categories there was general agreement except 
for the inclusion of pensions and separation allowances.^7 
The British and French delegations particularly urged the 
inclusion of pensions and allowances. With the rejection 
of war costs, the British had to find sonic formula that 
would assure Great Britain and the dominions a fair share 
in the reparations payments.^ Prance also had a tremen­
dous pension burden which the French hoped to transfer to 
Germany.^9 Again the delegates from the United States 
opposed their European Allies on the grounds that pensions 
and allowances were part of war costs and not an item of
^°Burnett, op. cit., I, 26-275 600; Tardieu, on. cit 
p. 293; For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, XIII, 1|-19 •
^Baruch, Reparation, p. 2 6 , 32-3);.; Burnett, op. cit
II, 391-k239 I.j.26-32. rfBy separation allowances is meant pay 
b^ r the governments to families and relatives who normally 
depended for their support upon persons in military service. 
Baruch, Reparation, p. 26, note.
^Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, )p91.
^9(pardieu, op. cit., p. 292.
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civilian d a m a g e . 30 Lord Sumner prepared a lengthy exposi­
tion of the British viev/point, which he read to the Ameri­
can delegation on March 27# He argued for the inclusion 
of pensions and separation allowances on the grounds that 
the soldier is 11 simply a civilian called to arms in the 
cause of justice; his uniform makes no difference. . . .  I 
think that history will not find In his case anything to 
deprive him of civilian rights.”31 President Wilson re­
jected Lord Sumner1s arguunents as being too legalistic.
It was then that Lloyd George asked General Smuts, whom 
the President greatly admired, to give his opinion on the
*2 O
subject.
On March 31* 1919* ln a short, clear, well-written 
paper, Smuts supported the inclusion of pensions and sep­
aration allowances. He took as his starting point the 
reservation of the Allies in the Lansing note. The Ger­
mans, by accepting this note,
. . . acknowledged their liability to compensation
for all damage to the civilian population or their 
property wherever and however arising, so long as 
it was the result of German aggression. The Presi­
dent’s limitation to restoration of the invaded 
territories only of some of the Allies was clearly 
abandoned.
Smuts then explained his understanding of the phrase
3^Burnett, op. cit., I, 753-62* 
3 1Xbid., I, 722-23.
3 2Ibld., I, 6 3 .
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"civilian population" not by any legalistic on involved
reasoning but by a simple example*
A shop keeper in a village in northern France lost 
his shop through enemy bombardment, and was himself 
badly wounded. He would be entitled as one of the 
civilian population to compensation for the loss of 
his property and for his personal disablement* He 
subsequently recovered completely, was called up for 
military service, and after being badly wounded and 
spending some time in the hospitals was discharged as 
permanently unfit. The expense he was to the French 
Government during this period as a soldier (his pay 
and maintenance, Inis uniform, rifle, ammunition, his 
keep in hospital, etc.) was not damage to a civilian, 
but military loss to his Government, and it is there­
fore arguable that the French Government cannot recover 
compensation for such expense Linder the above reserva­
tion. His wife, however, was during this period deprived 
of her bread-winner, and she therefore suffered damage 
as a member of the civilian population, for which she 
would be entitled to compensation. In other words the 
separation allowances paid to her and her children 
during this period by the French Government would have 
to be made good by the German Government, as the com­
pensation which the allowances represent was their 
liability. After the soldier1s discharge as unfit, he 
rejoins the civilian population, and as for the future 
he cannot (in whole or in part) earn his own livelihood, 
he is suffering damage as a member of the civilian popu­
lation, for which the German Government are again liable 
to make compensation. In other words the pension for 
disablement which he draws from the French Government 
is really a liability of the German Government, which 
they must under the above reservation make good to the 
French Government. It could not be argued that as he 
was disabled while a soldier he does not suffer damage 
as a civilian after his discharge If he is unfit to 
do his ordinary work. He does literally suffer as
Q.J civilian after his discharge, and his pension Is 
intended to make good this damage, and is therefore a 
liability of the German Government. If he had been 
killed on active service, his wife as a civilian would 
have been totally deprived of her bread-winner, and 
would be entitled to compensation. In other words the 
pension she would draw from the French Government would 
really be a liability of the German Government under the 
above reservation, and would have to be made good by 
them to the French Government.
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He concluded his argument "by saying:
The plain, coirmonsense construction of the reser­
vation therefore, leads to the conclusion that . . .  
disablement pensions to discharged soldiers, or pen­
sions to widows and. orphans or separation allowances 
paid to their wives and children during the period 
of their military service are all items representing 
compensation to members of the civilian population 
for damage sustained by them, for which the German 
Government are liable.33
Smuts »s argument was not very different from Sum­
ner's, but it was of vastly greater importance because it 
persuaded President Wilson to allow the inclusion of pen­
sions in the reparations demanded of Germany. Lloyd George 
said, "General Smuts was recognized to be a man of tolerant 
views, detached from the intensities of European feeling 
about the Germans, and in consequence his conclusions on 
this matter carried great weight."^!- Baruch said that 
Smuts was well-known as "one of the most liberal and cou­
rageous men at the Peace Conference" and that his note 
won the "unanimous consent of . . . the Big P o u r . "35
According to Hancock, Smuts1s memorandum on 
reparations did "more damage to his reputation than any-
^Burnett, op. cit., I, 773-75. dee also Baruch, 
Reparation, pp. 29-32.
^Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, b_96-97* See 
also Burnett, op. cit., I, 775-78.
35Baruch, Reparation, p. 29. See also Tillman,
thing else lie over wrote."36 Keynes called It a nnastop-
piece of tlie sophist’s art,"37 and Baruch later agreed with
this indictment•33 On the other hand, Dulles challenged
Keynes’s statement. He said that, although he had himself
concluded that pensions and separation allowances were not
chargeable to Germany,
. . . many people whose intellect and sincerity
command the confidence of the world reached a 
contrary conclusion. . . .  Whatever one’s personal 
views may be, anyone who considers this subject In 
a spirit of fairness can hardly deal In a contemp­
tuous and offhand way with the sincere and. reasoned 
judgment of men such as General Smuts.39
Another writer said soon after the Peace Conference:
It is of interest to observe that the most 
generally assailed provision In the treaty, that 
making Germany responsible for pensions and allow­
ances, was proposed by General Smuts, whom no one can 
accuse of vindictiveness towards Germany. While there 
were many who condemned the policy of including pen­
sions In reparation, and it Is unquestionably the 
largest financial item In Germany’s Indebtedness, it 
is also well not to forget t^ iat there wore some high- 
minded men who supported it.'-'-O
Smuts gave this explanation of his stand on
36Hancock, op. cit. , p. j?l5.
-^Keynes, op. cit., p. 5>3*
•^Baruch, Public Years, p. 10,9*
39p;tienne Kantoux, The Carthaginian Peace or the 
geo nomic Con sentiences of MrT Keynes' '(Hew York': Chari e s'
Scribner’s Sons, 19^2), p* 101, note.
'■‘^ Temperley, op. cit. , II, 1)l. That Smuts "pro­
posed11 the inclusion of pensions and allowances is, of 
course, not true; he merely supported the inclusion 
proposed by others.
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reparations to the South. African Parliament f our years after 
the Peace Conference.
nBoth in the British Empire delegation and out of it 
in other sections I used every scrap of such influ­
ence as I possessed to get the reparation figures 
down to a fair moderate fixed amount. It is perfectly 
well known to those who took part in the conference 
that I was probably the most active protagonist at 
the conference for fixing the reparation amount at 
a reasonably low figure. I Incurred odium and obloquy 
at the conference because of the energy with which I
pushed my view on the dangerous subject. The view I
consistently advocated was that, whether pensions were 
or were not Included--IndeeG, whatsoever items or valu­
ations of damage were accepted as between the Allies—  
as regards the Germans the amount due whould be defi­
nitely fixed in the Peace Treaty, and that it should 
be such as Germany could reasonably pay without dis­
location of her economic life. Unfortunately this 
view did not prevail. The actual result of the repara­
tion procedure has been brought about against my ad­
vice, and in the teeth of my strongest opposition, and 
I disclaim all responsibility for the result.
He.also said that if he had known so much would depend on
his opinion, he would not have given it so readily.
!,I assumed at the time . . . that I was only one
of the many who were giving opinions about reparations.
. . . There was the feeling among the more moderate
delegates that Germany v/ould pay no more than a fixed 
amount; that what faced us now was only a matter of 
distributing this fixed amount; and that T1clvlllan 
damageslt could be interpreted either narrowly or 
•widely, but a narrow Interpretation would give Prance 
and Belgium almost everything and England almost 
nothing and a wide interpretation would result in a 
just <awapd.,,l2
-^-4-IIllin, op. cit., II, 205>-206. On June 1, 1 9 1 9* 
Smuts suggested that 000,000,000 might be fixed as the 
total reparation figure, although he thought that figure 
was nrobably not high enough* Lloyd George, Pea.ce Treaties,
1 , > 9 3 .
■I.Ii 11 in, op. cit., II, 207.
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Smuts*s son gave a similar explanation:
My Tatlier!s point in insisting on the inclusion 
of allowances and pensions was to ensure that the 
war-ravished countries of Europe did not get the 
lion* s share while financially exhausted Engle-nd 
was left in the cold. It was only later when Prance 
swelled her reparation amount to fantastic proportions, 
my father said, that it became not only a farce but 
tTone of those things that are responsible for the 
Germany of today. T,d-3
It can be seen that Smuts believed at the time that 
Germany* s liability for reparations would be stated In the 
treaty as a definite, fixed sum. Wilson believed the same, 
nBoth Wilson and Smuts . . . were almost certainly con­
vinced at the time that they were making a decision as to 
the distribution of a fixed sum and not as to the size of 
that sum, Smuts *s memorandum on pensions was his sole
contribution to the reparations section of the treaty.
Lloyd George later asked him to serve on the Commission on 
Austrian Reparations, but he refused.^
^Smuts, Jr., op. cit., p. 207*
'■^Tillman, op. cit. , p. 2k6. Thomas A. Bailey, 
Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace, In Wilson and the Peace­
makers (hew York: Macrmllan Co.,’ 19l<-7T> PP* 2lL0-k3, con-"
tended that the decision to include pensions was morally 
wrong, because against the spirit if not the letter of the 
pre-Armistice agreements. He agreed, however, that Wilson, 
as well as Smuts, was sure a moderate fixed sum would be 
included in the treaty. Wilson was opposing Prance on 
everything and perhaps thought he should give in on some­
thing which he thought at the time was of minor importance. 
Birdsall, op. cit., p. 2jl, agreed generally with Bailey.
‘k^Millin, op. cit. , II, 211-lIt; Hancock, on. cit., 
p p . 5 2 6 - 2 7 •
Had a fixed sum of moderate proportions been decided
upon at Paris, Germany might have paid, and the effect which
Smuts desired might have taken place, with Britain receiving
a share in reparations in proportion to her contribution to
the war. As it actually happened, after weeks of debate and
deliberation, the Allies failed to decide upon either a
fixed sum to demand of Germany or a definite time limit in
)i Awhich to collect it. • The final solution was to write into 
the treaty a provision for a Reparation Commission to settle 
all such matters. The Commission in 19 2 1 set the sum to be 
paid by Germany at approximately §335 000,000,000, about 
two-thirds of which was for pensions and allowances,^ This 
sum was never paid. It was scaled down by the Dawes Plan 
and the Young Plan and finally canceled altogether in 1932. 
Because of foreign loans to Germany in the meantime, mostly 
from the United States, Germany actually made a profit out 
of the reparations scheme. That Germany could not pay was 
disproved by the vast sums Hitler spent on armaments In the 
years immediately after the ending of reparations. Repara­
tions were not paid because Germany, as was quite natural,
It ftdid not 7/ant to pay them.
^ F o r . Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, V, 19-33,
^Bailey, op. cit., p. RliO.
^Llantoux, op. cit., pp. 133-55* 15&.
CHAPTER V I
SMUTS AND THE MI SSI 01-7 TO HUNGARY
’iVh.ile the representatives of the victorious na­
tions were pondering in Paris over the future fate of 
Europe, events were occurring in central Europe which 
they could not ignore. One series of events was impor­
tant to the story of Smuts in 1919 for it was to take him 
away from Paris on a diplomatic mission to Hungary.
An armistice had been concluded on November 3* 
1913, between the representatives of the Italian Supreme 
Command and the Supreme Command of what still called it­
self the Austro-Hungarian Army, even though. there was no 
longer in fact an Austro-Hungarian Empire.-*- The Poles, 
Czechs, Yugo-Slavs, and Magyars had all declared their 
independence of Habsburg power and had set up Independent 
states. Less than a week before the armistice, 011 Octo­
ber 31i Count Michael Karolyi had been entrusted with 
forming a government for Hungary which was to be linked
p
with Austria only by a common monarch. Then on November
iTemperley, op. cit., I, 351* For the text of 
this armistice see For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, 
II, 175-32 and Francis Deal:, Hungary at the Paris Peace 
Conference (New York: Columbia Uni"versity—Press", I9E 2T ,---- |gTTPP. 3p p -5'-».
2
Ibid., pp. 7-3; Denis Sinor, History of Hungary 
(London: G-eorge Allen & Unwin, 3-959) > P • 232.
11 Charles IV, the last Habsburg emperor, relinquished the 
Austrian throne, and on November 13 he did the same with 
the Hungarian throne. On November l6 the Hungarian People1 
Republic was proclaimed with Karolyi as Premier. ^
Because the November 3 armistice had treated 
Austria-Hungary as a single entity, it was necessary for 
the Allies to draw up a military convention to regulate 
conditions under which the terms of the armistice were to 
be applied to Hungary; it was signed at Belgrade on Novem­
ber 139 1913. This convention provided for the occupation 
of a specified zone of Hungarian territory, the right to 
extend that occupation wherever it might be thought neces­
sary, and the demobilization of almost all of the Hungarian 
forces,^
As the convention of November 13 did not draw 
definite lines of demarcation along the entire Eumanian- 
Hungarian border, friction soon developed between the 
troops of the two countries. Rumania protested to the 
Paris Conference that Hungarian forces were terrorizing 
the Rumanian parts of Hungary which they still occupied.
^Deak, op. cit., p. J 9 note; Emil Lengyel, 1,000 
Years of Hun,gar?/ (New York: The John Day Company, Top^Tj
pp. 195-96 •
^'Temperley, op. cit., I, 352* IV, Ip3-59J Deak, 
op. cit., pp. 10-11. For the text of this military con­
vention see For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, II,
133-35 and Peak, op. cit., up. 3 5 9-6 1 .
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As a result, in February of 1919> General Franchet d*Esperey, 
C ommander-in-Chief of the allied forces In southeast Europe, 
proposed and the Conference agreed to set a more definite 
line of demarcation and to provide a neutral, unoccupied 
zone between the Rumanian and Hungarian troops.5 Colonel 
Vlx, the French officer at the head of the military mission 
In Budapest, accompanied by representatives, both official 
and unofficial, of all the Allies, presented, this plan to 
Count Karolyi and his government on March 19* Captain 
Nicholas Roosevelt, the unofficial American representative, 
reported, the scene to the Conference. According to Roose­
velt, Karolyi interpreted the note to mean that the Ru­
manians were to advance one hundned kilometers Into Hun­
garian territory while the Hungarians withdrew two hundred 
kilometers. He declared that any government which accepted 
such a plan would not last a d.ay. Furthermore, If the note 
were signed, the communists In Hungary would Increase from
a few thousand, to two hundred thousand, or more. For all
A
these reasons he could not possibly agree to the plan.
Colonel Vix, and the note itself, made It clear that the 
lines established, by the note were only temporary military 
lines for keeping the peace and. had nothing to do with the
^Temperley, on. cit., I, 353* IV, 159* For the 




final political boundaries, which would be decided later. 
Karolyi chose to disbelieve these assurances because the 
lines closely followed the ethnic boundaries between Ru­
manians and Hungarians. He was certain that the Allies 
had already decided upon the boundaries for his country.7 
Karolyi, refusing to accept the Allies1 demarcation plan, 
resigned his office on March 21 and handed, over the gov­
ernment to a group of People*s Commissars, whose first
q
action was to declare Hungary a Soviet Republic. 0
The leader of the new government was Bela Kun, who
was admirably equipped for his job. He ha.d been an in­
structor in a university before the war, then an officer 
in the Austro-Hungarian army. He was captured by the 
Russians in 1915 a^d had remained in Russia imbibing com­
munist doctrine until the revolution. Under Kerensky he 
became the head of a bureau of propaganda and later came 
into contact with both Trot3Icy and Lenin. When the war 
ended, he returned to Hungary to preach communism among
disaffected soldiers and idle workmen. In time he was ar­
rested. by Karolyi*s government and remained In prison until 
Karolyi*s resignation. Immediately upon the fall of the 
Karolyi government, Bela Kun was released from prison and
^Temper ley, op. cit., I, 353* IV, 159 5 Ron. Reis. 
of U.S., Peace Conference, XII, kl7•
^Sinor, on. cit., p. 233; Deak, on. cit., p. 57.
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made People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and "became 
the idol of the Budapest p r o l e t a r i a t . " 9
The new communist ministers openly proclaimed their 
desire to further the domination of the proletariat by 
every means at their disposal. They also announced that 
they had made an alliance Y/ith the Soviet government of 
Moscow.3-0 The revolution, however, had. been bloodless and 
was interpreted by Captain Roosevelt as having been pri­
marily the result of national feeling. The Hungarians did 
not want their country further decreased in size and v«rere 
willing to accept communism to prevent such a disaster. 
Roosevelt believed the Hungarian revolution v/as very impor­
tant because it represented open defiance to the first 
major public decision of the Paris Conference with regard 
to one of the Central Powers; the encouragement this action 
would give to Germany might prove disastrous.
Bela Kun naturally was eager to have his government 
recognised by the victorious Allies. Consequently, only 
three days after coming to power, he delivered a note to 
the Peace Conference in Paris by vj-ay of the Italian minister 
in Belgrade. The note was read to the Council of Four by
^Ualbone W. Graham, Jr., assisted by Robert C. 
Binkley, ITev/ Governments of Central Europe (Nev: York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1926), pp. 215-19•
■^Temperley, on. cit., I, 353.
^For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, XII, klb-19.
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Orlando on March. 29. The message declared that the new 
government of Hungary accepted the armistice of November 3 9 
1 9lo, and did not think that the rejection of the Vix note 
had infringed that agreement. Further, the alliance with 
Russia was not a formal alliance but merely an entente 
cordial©* Hungary wished to live in peace with her neigh­
bors and the western Allies. The note continued:
The Hungarian Socialist Party has been driven by 
the force of the events to take hold of the executive 
power. It wishes to organize a new social State, a 
State in which every man will live of his own work, 
but this social State will not be hostile to other 
Nations. It wishes on the contrary to co-operate 
for the great human solidarity.
Furthermore, Hungary was ready to ^negotiate territorial 
questions on the basis of the principle of self-determina­
tion of the People.” The note concluded by saying that 
the government of Hungary
. . . would, gladly welcome a civil and. diplomatic 
mission of the Entente in Ehxdapest and would guarantee 
to it the right of extraterritoriality and undertake 
to provide for its absolute safety.^
After the Big Four heard Kunfs message, ”a proposal 
was made that, without sending a formal diplomatic mission, 
some discreet and confidential person should be sent to 
ascertain the real position.” Lloyd George at once suggested 
General Smuts for the mission. ^  Y/ith a party of fourteen
~^~^For. Reis, of J.S., Peace Conference, V, 13.
^^Ibid., V, lo. The minutes of this meeting record 
that no final decision concerning the mission or the person
91
Smuts left Pauls the evening of April 1 , His instructions 
were:
• . . to examine the general working of the Armis­
tice of November 3rd, 1913; the Llilitary Convention 
of November 13th, 1913; the stasis of the new govern­
ment; economic conditions; and, in particular, the 
arrangements about the neutral zone. He was to ex­
plain to the Hungarian Government that this zone had 
only the purpose of stopping bloodshed: it would
not affect the eventual disposition of boundaries 
■under the Peace Treaty; and he was himself to make 
the adjustments he thought desirable in the present 
boundaries,
He was further to investigate the progress of 
Bolshevism, and, in general, for the purposes of his 
mission, to go wherever he chose in Hungary, and do 
anything, 1 -^
The following morning Harold Nicolson, a young
British diplomat in the party, had a long talk with Smuts
in which he gained the impression that the real idea back
of the mission was nto see whether Bela Kun is worth using
as a vehicle for getting into touch with Moscow.”1^ Years
later Smuts denied, that there was any such hidden purpose
behind the trip. Nevertheless, his biographer said:
If anyone, In those days, saw In Smuts1 mind the 
thought of Moscow it was with good reason. He had 
Moscow on the brain: he saw everywhere, and par­
ticularly In the future, the red hand, of Moscow; 
even his pleas on behalf of Germany v/ere largely 
grounded In his fear of Moscow. It must have been
to head it was made at that time. The matter was to be 
discussed again on March 31? "but the next minutes are for 
a meeting on April 5 after Smuts had left for Hungary.
1 11
Mvlillin, op. cit. , j_I, lb7*
id
^Nicolson, op. cit., p. 293*
92
with, the feeling of going to see an ugly fascinating 
sight that he was now on his j£[ay to roaice contact with 
an actual Soviet Government.
The morning of April 3 the party arrived in Vienna* 
Uicolson recorded the pinched, yellow look of the fat- 
starved people and the unkempt, littered appearance of the 
once-gay city. They were met at the British Embassy by 
Sir Thomas Cunninghame, head of the military mission there, 
to whom Smuts took an instant dislike. Cunninghame took 
them to lunch at Sachers, where they were served a huge 
and expensive meal. Smuts was furious and. dressed Cunning­
hame down for his “’gross error in taste. Tf1 He decreed 
that from then on his party would eat only their own army 
rations and would take nothing from the starving countries 
they were visiting. The youthful Nicolson added, MIt was 
a good luncheon all the same.'1^
On the morning of April It the party arrived in 
Budapest, which looked even sadder and more bedraggled 
than Vienna. Smuts decided that the entire party would 
remain on the train; they would not enter the city. Ac­
cordingly, Bela Kun was sent for and came to the train, 
not once, but three times that day to confer v/ith Smuts. 
Uicolson described him as:
A little man of about 30: puffy white face and
op. cit., II, 133.
^Alieolson, op. cit., pp. 293-9-!-»
loose wet lips: sliaven head: impression of red
hair: shifty suspicious eyes: . . . the face of
a sulky and uncertain criminal.
Smuts talked with this unprepossessing individual "as if 
he were talking to the Duke of Albercorn: friendly, cour­
teous hut not a touch of any surrender of his own tremendou 
dignity."-*-9 The only result of that day* s negotiations was 
that Bela liun signed a paper promising to release all Brit­
ish subjects whom he had Imprisoned* 2 ^1
Throughout the day and evening Smuts had several 
visitors besides Kun. Professor Brown, "one of President 
Wilson*s * enquirers,1n took a "Wilsonian," that is, an 
"unpractical view" of the situation. He spoke of the good 
ord.er Kun was maintaining and of the need for "*natural 
social evolution.1"2^ In contrast, the Spanish and Swiss 
Consuls told Smuts that Kun had not shown moderation; the 
prisons were packed with people. "They confirm what every­
body says, namely, that Bela Kun is just an incident and 
not worth treating seriously. " 22
Before the long day ended, Smuts telegraphed a re­
port to Paris. He had explained fully to Kim, he reported,
^Hicolson, op. cit., p. 2 9 6.
1 9Ibid., p. 3 0 1 .
2QIbid., p. 301.
2 1Ibid., p. 297.
2 2Ibid., pp. 3 0 1-3 0 2.
9 k
that the line suggested by Colonel Vix was not to be a 
permanent political frontier but was only to maintain 
peace and order. Kun gave two reasons why he could not 
order the Hungarian troops to retire behind, the proposed 
line. First, to do so would cause his government to fall 
even as the mere demand had caused Karolyi!s to fall. 
Second, such an order would not be obeyed as he had little 
hold over the troops occupying the territory In question. 
Bela Kun further said that if his government fell, chaos 
would result as no other party Y/as capable of forming a 
government. Kun added that if the Allies insisted on 
their present policy, they would have to come and run 
Hungary themselves. Smuts further reported that Bela Kun 
had made a counter-proposal of his own. He suggested that 
representatives of the Hungarian, German, Austrian, Bohe­
mian, Serbian, and Rumanian governments should meet to 
settle among themselves the whole question of their fron­
tiers. Furthermore, the economic position of the ney/ 
states might also be dealt with at the meeting, since, as 
Kun said, the question of food was more Important at the 
moment than frontiers. Smuts concluded his report by 
urging the acceptance of Kun*s suggestion. Such a meeting 
could be easily arranged, he thought, Inasmuch as most of 
the nabions were already represented at Paris and delegates 
from Hungary, Austria, and Germany would have to be called
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there in any event to sign the Peace T r e a t y .
The next morning, April 5, Bela Kun returned to 
Smuts*s train for more negotiations. ITicolson recorded in 
his diary:
Smuts hands him a draft agreement providing for 
the occupation by the Great Powers of a neutral 
zone between him and the Rumanians. If he agrees 
to this we shall raise the blockade. It is clear 
that Bela Kun longs to accept it. The signature 
of such a document would imply official recognition 
of his regime, which he desires passionately. But 
he Is suspicious and afraid. Clasping the document 
he leaves us--saying he must consult his Cabinet.
That means he must, consult Moscow. He promises us 
a reply by seven.
At seven Kun d.uly returned with several comrades. He agreed 
to accept Smuts* s terms but added a clause of his own: that
the Rumanian army was to withdraw behind, the Maros River; 
that is, the line laid down in the military convention of 
November 13* "*No, gentlemen,*" Smuts said, "'there must
be no reservations.*" He made a final appeal, to them to 
accept his terms as being in their own best interests. The 
communists evidently expected Smuts to bargain further, 
but he had come to the conclusion that Bela Kun was of no 
importance and was not capable of giving effect to any 
treaty. As the Hungarians were still standing on the plat­
form, Smuts gave the order for the train to start; it 
pulled out of the station leaving some very astonished
^ For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, V, kl-L;.3#
pj,
•Hicolson, op. cit., p. 302.
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comrades staring after it.^5
Hicolson continued his account: "We then dine.
Smuts is delightful, telling us stories of the Veldt with 
a ring of deep homesickness in his voice. A lovely man."2  ^
Smuts again telegraphed a report to Paris on the 
day*s negotiations. He described the line which he had 
proposed as "running further east than Colonel Vix's line, 
but nevertheless well to the west of the territory which 
the Roumanian Committee of the Conference assigned to 
Roumania in their Report." The Hungarian officials, Smuts 
reported, refused to accept this line as It would, in their 
opinion, have resulted in civil war In the neutral zone and 
the fall of their government. Smuts had rejected the line 
proposed by the Hungarians on the grounds that troaible with 
Rumania would have immediately followed. He was convinced, 
that there was no hostility towards the great powers 011 
the part of Bela Kunfs regime. It was, however, weak and 
would likely fall at an early date. Smuts concluded that 
the wisest course to follow would be "not to provoke a 
conflict over the armistice terms which may be unnecessary, 
but, after hearing the Hungarians' statement in Paris or 
some other place, to settle the final political frontiers." 
Meanwhile, he recommended that the trainload of fats
2-%icolson, op. cit., pp. 3 0 3-30!’.. 
Ibid. , p. 30!l.
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already bought and paid for by the Hungarians should be 
allowed to enter the country although the blockade itself 
should not yet be lifted. ^
Smuts returned to Vienna and from there went to 
Prague* where he had an hour-long private Interview with 
President Thomas Masaryk. The two men discussed the prob­
lem of the boundaries to be established between Czecho­
slovakia and. Hungary, although their discussion had no
p o
effect on the final solution. ° They also discussed the 
advisability of a conference of central European states 
as suggested by Bela Kun. Masaryk was In favor of some 
sort of economic union between Hungary, Austria, and the 
neighboring countries, supervised by the League of Nations. 
Such a union, Masaryk thought, might be the saving of 
Europe, and he was willing to participate In conferences 
leading to that end. Smuts also approved of some such 
plan, seeing In It a variation of his mandates idea.^9 
After seeing Masaryk, Smuts returned to Paris, by way of 
Vienna, arriving there on April 9*
NIcolson concluded his account of the mission In 
the following words:
^ For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, V, 6l-62.
^°Ibid., IV, 6 6 9 ; Deak, op. cit., pp. 6’.;.-6 6 , K31-33; 
NIcolson, op. cit., pp. 32Ll-2£.
^Millin, op. cit., II, l93-9^«
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The papers say that the Smuts mission has been 
a ifiasco. 1 I think it was in a way, but then our 
whole purpose was obscure and illogical. Yet we 
have gained the following: (1) A conviction that
Bela Kun and Hungarian Bolshevism Is not a serious 
menace and cannot last. (2) A valuable talk between 
Smuts and Masaryk. (3) A conviction that Austria- 
Hungary i_s an economic ainit and that these trade 
barriers are fatal, (k) negatively--Smnts refrained 
from using Kun as a liaison with Moscow. His sense 
and dignity were superb.30
Smuts also realized that the trip was not a diplo­
matic triumph.31 in fact, It is possible that the Immediate 
effect of the mission was the opposite of what Smuts in­
tended. The recognition of the communist government in 
Hungary by the Peace Conference, although not formally 
stated, probably weakened conservatives and strengthened 
revolutionaries throughout Europe.3^
Smuts espoused Kunfs suggestion for a conference 
of the central European states and, back In Paris, tried 
to Interest others in the Idea. Colonel House and. President 
Wilson were Interested, but the Italians were hostile, and 
Lloyd George was Indifferent. The conference was never 
held.33
As for Bela Kun, he lasted longer than Smuts had
33,Nicoi_SOn, op. cit. , p. 307.
3-^Bonsal, op. cit., p. 139*
3^For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, XII,
J,Jrg-1 (.9 ; Deak, op. cit., pp. 62'-63'.
^Bonsai, op. cit., pp. I>|.l-k2; TJillin, o^. cit.,
XI, 19-1!-
99
foreseen* While the Supreme Council of the Allies did 
nothing, Kun built up an army and fought both the Czechs 
and the Rumanians. 7/hen the Rumanians were within sight 
of Budapest, which they occupied on August 8, 19195 Bela 
Kun fled to Russia. There he dropped out of sight--a 
victim of the purges of the thirties. 3k
Although diplomatically unsuccessful, the trip to 
Hungary was for Smuts a refreshing interlude away from 
the depressing atmosphere of Paris.35 Upon his return, 
he njoined in the wrangling1 with the other delegates.^ 
His efforts after his return were largely directed toward 
revising the terms of the nearly-completed treaty with 
Germany.
^^Temperley, op. cit., I, 3?!'--57, IV, l6o-6l; Dealt,
op. cit., 103-lOb.; Lengyel, op. cit., p. 202.
3^Smuts, Jr., op. cit., p. 211.
3 Ivlillin, op. cit., II, 19.);..
CHAPTER V I I
SMUTS Al-TD THE TREATY OP VERSAILLES
General Smuts worked as hard as anyone to defeat 
Germany as long as the war continued, but, once the fight­
ing stopped, he, almost alone, retained no bitterness 
against the former enemy* In fact, only two men at the 
Peace Conference felt any genuine sympathy for the defeated 
nation: Smuts and his colleague, General Botha* Of the
two, Smuts was by far the more vocal.-*- In his opinion it 
was Prussian militarism which had been the enemy--not the 
German, people. A few days after the Armistice, in pleading 
the 111 sheer practical necessity* 11 of a League of Rations, 
he said:
"How as we organised the world for victory, 
let us organise it against hunger and unemployment.
Rot only the liberated territories of our Allies, 
not only our small neutral neighbors, but the enemy 
countries themselves, require our helping hand. Let 
us extend it in all generosity and magnanimity•
Later, at the opening of the Conference he asked that Ger­
many be treated with n*pity and restraint,* pointing out 
that * civilization Is one body and we are all members of
■hyilllin, op. cit., II, 195>-9&; Kraus, op. cit., 
p. 272; Tillman, op. cit., p. 3^ -7*
^Millin, op. cit. , II, 156; Smuts, Jr., op. cit., 
p. 197; Crafford, op. cit., p. 133.
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one another*1”3 The words npity and restraint” expressed 
Smuts1 s ideals, from v/hich he never departed, as to the 
spirit in which the peace should be made. As the weeks 
went by and. lesser ideals began to prevail at the Confer­
ence, Smuts protested to everyone who would listen. One 
writer said, ”3y March he had already earned the reputation 
of being not only a moralist but a gadfly into the bar­
gain. 1 ^
Smuts based his pleas for Germany on two main prem­
ises which he expressed in a letter to Lloyd George on 
March 26. The first was his own experience in South Africa.
My experience in South Africa has made me a firm 
believer in political magnanimity, and your and 
Campbell-Bannerman1s great record still remains 
not only the noblest but also the most successful 
page in recent British statesmanship^
The second was his fear of Russia and communism. He sug­
gested that, even though the enormity of their crimes ought 
to be brought home to the German people, Germany should be 
left strong enough to act as a bulwark against communism.
^Smuts, Jr., op. cit., p. 20o; Crafford, op* cit.,
P. 153.
^'Kraus, op. cit., p. 27li» Hancock, op. cit., 
pp. 5o3-5>09, recorded" that Smuts was absent from Paris from 
February 15 to March 23 and was ill in London for most of 
that time. There he brood.ed over the reports from Paris.
On his return, he intensified his campaign against the 
treaty.
g
Ibid., p. 5>12. See also Millin, op. cit., II, 197> 
2li-5>> 2 6 3 ; Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, 1, 2$b; Crafford, 
o p . cit., p. 15J-I-; Kraus, op. cit., p. 270.
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The self-respect of the German people should also be built 
up so that they might continue to believe in their own 
civilization and reject that offered by Russia. He summed 
up his arguments this way:
1. We cannot destroy Germany Y/ithout destroying 
Europe.
2. We cannot save Europe without the cooperation 
of Germany. . . .
My fear Is that the Paris Conference may prove 
one of the historic failures of the Yrorld.
Lloyd George was also d.Isturbed by the way the 
treaty was developing; in fact, his vieYrs were very similar 
to those expressed by Smuts.7 In order to clarify the 
position of the British delegation, Lloyd George retired 
from Paris for a few days with, some of his advisors, In­
cluding General Smuts.^ The result of this conference was 
the Fontainebleau memorandum, dated March 25.9 Although 
this document was written in the first person as If It ex­
pressed the views of Lloyd George only, It closely resem­
bled some of the writings of Smuts both in language and 
in ideas, particularly In the general opening statement.
6Hancock, op. cit., pp. 510-12. See also Llillin, 
op. cit., II, 1 9 6-9 0 ; Smuts, Jr., op. cit., p. 206; Kraus,
., pp . 271 — ( 2.
^Hancock, op. cit., p. 513*
^Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, Il03.
^Ibid., I, Ip3lt.-l6. R. S. Baker, op. cit. , III, 
!ili9-57> printed part of this document but credited it to 
General Tasker II. Bliss, one of the plenipotentiaries 
from the United States.
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One memorable sentence of this document was quoted, by three
of his biographers as being Smuts* s ovm words:
You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her 
armaments to a mere police force and her navy to 
that of a fifth.-rs.te power; all the same in the 
end if she feels that she has been unjustly treated 
in the peace of 1 9 19 sl>-e will find means of exact­
ing retribution from her conquerors,^
On May 6 the full text of the treaty with Germany
was assembled and presented to the delegates at a plenary
session of the Conference.^ The worst fears of Smuts and
other liberals were confirmed upon hearing the entire
treaty. During an early morning walk on May 7* Smuts and
Keynes met Herbert Hoover, who also thought the treaty was
too severe. The three agreed that the "consequences of
many parts of the proposed Treaty would ultimately bring
destruction.1 They decided to work among their colleagues
in an attempt to have the treaty revised.-^
When the treaty was submitted to the German dele-
Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, Ll05; Crafford, 
op. cit., pp. 153-5^; Smuts, Jr., op. cit., p. 206; Millin, 
op. cit., II, 198. Hancock, op. cit., pp. 5l3-lp* wrote 
that Smuts was not present at Fontainebleau when this memo 
was prepared. The fact that he wrote the letter quoted 
above to Lloyd George on March 26 supports Hancock*s view. 
On the other hand, Lloyd George named Smuts as the first 
of the advisors he took with him. The fact that some of 
the very words of the memo were credited to Smuts supports 
the view that he did help prepare the document. Certainly, 
it expressed his ideas.
11
For. Reis, of XT.S., Peace Conference, III, 33^-79* 
Each delegate received a printed copy of the treaty.
^%Ioover, op. cit. , p. 23lf.
gation on May 7* the head. or the delegation, Gount Brock- 
dorff-Rantzau, read a prepared statement in which he said 
that the German people could never admit that they alone 
were guilty of* the war, although they admitted a degree of 
guilt and a willingness to restore the territory of Bel­
gium and France* He recalled the ore-Amiistice agreement 
and said that the German delegation 'would examine the 
treaty in the light of that agreement* Finally, he asked 
that Germany be allowed to join the League of Hations at
once *-*-3
After the presentation of the treaty, Smuts inten­
sified his efforts to have it revised* In the middle of 
May he told the British Empire delegation:
uIf the Germans are prepared to swallow this Treaty,
I still consider its provisions such as to make fu­
ture peace and goodwill In Europe unlikely; • • • 
the fires will be kept burning and the pot be kept 
boiling until it again boils over, either in a new 
war, or in the breakdown of the European system under 
the onslaught of social and industrial anarchy.
A few days later he wrote identical letters to President
Wilson and Lloyd George asking each to use his M|power and
influence to make the final Treaty a more moderate and
reasonable document. 111 He criticized especially the
^ For* Reis* of U.S., Peace Conference, III, kl3-20 
Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, 1, 6'7"3>-B"2 * R* S • Baker, op * 
cit * , II, 500-50f>! Borden, op* cit*, II, 9 6 2-6 3 .
^Mlllin, op. cit*, II, 2l£; Smuts, Jr., on. cit.,
p .  211.
1 0 $
territorial, reparation, and occupation clauses, "’Under 
this Treaty Europe will know no peace, 1 " he feared.^ 
V/ilson answered in the most friendly way, signing himself 
"Cordially and sincerely yours, 11 He agreed with Smuts 
that the treaty should he just, but he called to mind the 
"very great offense against civilization which the G-erman 
State committed and the necessity for making it evident 
once for all that such things can lead only to the most 
severe punishment , 11
On May 22 Smuts again sent identical messages to
the President and the Prime Minister, This document -^7
was the most detailed prepared by Smuts on his objections
to the treaty. In it he said:
I think the two cardinal errors in policy of this 
Treaty are the long occupation of the Rhine, and 
the enlargement of Poland beyond anything which we 
had contemplated during the war. These two.errors 
are full of menace for the future peace of Europe, 
and I urge that every means be taken to remove them 
before it is too late.
He criticized the reparation clauses as being unworkable,
but he did not ask that pensions and allowances be removed.,
■**%!illin, op. cit., II, 2l6-17; Hancock, op. cit. , 
p. $22; Tillman, op. cit., p. 3V7 •
■^Hancock, op. cit,, p. $23; Millin, op. cit., II, 
217-18; Kraus, op. cit., p. 281.
^3ee R*. S. Laker, op. cit., III, hr$8-6$ for the 
full text.
l 8 I b i d . , I I I ,  k 6 l .
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He objected also to certain of the military and air clauses
and to the internationalization of Germany’s internal v/ater-
ways. Furthermore, he thought the treaty was
• • . full of small, comparatively unimportant 
provisions which serve no useful purpose, but 
must be unnecessarily galling and wounding to 
the feelings of a defeated enemy. . . . he should 
be careful to eliminate from it all trace of petty 
spite and ill-feeling, which cannot serve so great 
a cause as ours, nor promote the interests of fu­
ture goodwill and peace. -^9
Smuts concluded his letter with a paragraph suggesting a 
procedure to be followed in revising the treaty. As. it 
was very important that the ,rtreaty should not be capable 
of moral repudiation by the G-erman people hereafter,” the 
A.llies should confer with the Germans concerning their 
objections. He recommended that a committee of three minor 
delegates be chosen for this conference. The committee 
would report to the Supreme Council, which alone would take 
the responsibility for actual changes. Smuts thought such 
a method would remove all taint of dictation from the 
treaty and bring the public opinion of the world to accept 
it, while at the same time the Supreme Council would avoid 
direct negotiations with the Germans. After all, ”the 
final sanction of this great instrument must be the ap­
proval of mankind.”^
■^R. s. Baker, op. cit. , III, ko3 - 6 J'r.
2 0Ibid., III, )l6'l-65. See also Hancock, on. cit., 
pp. 5^5-26.
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The Germans submitted their formal observations on 
the peace terms to the Conference on May 29* In this 
lengthy document the Germans protested against the occupa­
tion clauses; asked that all nations agree to reduce their 
armaments to the same extent as Germany was being asked to 
do; asked that they be admitted to the League of nations 
at once and that they be named the mandatory under the 
League for their former colonies; renounced their rights 
to Alsace-Lorraine but asked for a plebiscite there; and 
protested many of the other territorial settlements, espe­
cially the loss of Upper Silesia to Poland* The Germans 
also made some counter-suggestions• They offered to pay 
as reparations something like £>2 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0, without 
interest, if concessions were made in other parts of the 
treaty. They also asked that a neutral inquiry be made 
to determine actual responsibility for the war, as they 
refused to accept full blame. Finally, they contended 
that the treaty did not conform to the pre-Armistice 
agreements--that It was not a “Wilson peace. ” 21
Smutsfs reaction to the German proposals was em­
bodied in a letter written to Wilson on Hay 30. The Ger­
mans were right In their contention that the treaty did 
not conform to Wilson’s principles, he said. Such a
2 1For. Reis, of U.S., Peace Conference, VI, 795-901. 
See also Tillman, op. cit., pp. 3k3-k9; Lloyd George, Peace 
Treaties, I, 682-SkT; rV S. Baker, on. cit., Ii, 512-13.
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breach, of faith on the part of the Allies would have very
grave consequences in the future* He explained:
This v/ar began with a breach of a solemn international 
undertaking, and it has been one of our most important 
war aims to vindicate international law and the sanc­
tity of international engagements* If the Allies end 
the war by following the example of Germany at the 
beginning, and also confront the world v/ith a "scrap 
of paper," the discredit on us will be so great that 
I shudder to think of its ultimate effect on public 
opinion*
There will be a terrible disillusion if the peoples 
come to think that we are not concluding a Wilson 
Peace, that we are not keeping our promises to the 
world or faith with the public. But If in so doing 
we appear a3.so to break the formal agreement deliber­
ately entered into (as I think we do), we shall be 
overwhelmed with, the gravest discredit, and this Peace 
may well become an even greater disaster to the world 
than the war was.^
The British Empire delegation held a special meeting 
on June 1 and 2 to consider what reply should be given to 
the German note. After a brief summing up by the Prime 
Minister of possible concessions to the Germans, the meeting 
was turned over to the other delegates. General Smuts led 
off with a very severe criticism of the treaty* His prin­
cipal objections, as In his previous letters, were to the 
occupation and reparation clauses, the eastern boundaries 
of Germany, and the internationalization of Genian rivers.
He urged that Germany be admitted to the League of Nations 
at once, !t 1 it being essential to carry her with us and re-
22R. S. Baker, op. °*’h ill, L66-63. See also 
Millin, op. cit*, II,Smuts, Jr., op. cit. 3 pp. 211- 
213-20; Hancock, op. cit., p.
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move the possibility of an.oth.er combination through Germany
and Russia joining hands in misfortune.*” He further said
that n*Poland was an historic failure, and always would be
a failure, and in this Treaty we were trying to reverse the
verdict of history.*n He thought that a definite sum should
be fixed as Germany*s liability in the matter of reparations.
He suggested the sum of L5,000,000,000, although that was
probably not high enough. ^6 He also reiterated his belief
that the treaty constituted a breach of a legal contract
because it was not in accordance with Wilson* s fourteen
points as provided by the pre-Armistice agreement,^
Although there was some support for Smuts*s views
among the other delegates, a very reasonable answer to his
objections was given by Balfour, who thought
General Smuts treated the matter in rather a too 
legal a manner. . . .  It was only necessary to read 
the Fourteen Points to see that they were incapable 
of being treated in a strictly legal manner.
It was a wrong attitude to fix the mind on the lam­
entations of the Germans, upon their misfortunes, 
when in fact the Germans were responsible to the 
Y/hole world. . . ♦ Germany was no unhappy victim of 
circumstances; she was suffering, and ought to suf­
fer, for her crimes; and there was no sign whatever 
that Germany v/as repentant. 6
At the conclusion of this meeting the "unanimous1
Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, 633-93* 
^'Hancock, op. cit., p. 529*
^Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, 695-96, 699*
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decisions or the delegation were embodied in a draft reso­
lution for Lloyd GeorgeTs use in bis talks with, the other 
members of the Council of Four. Smuts was incensed at the 
use of the word ''unanimous," as the resolution did not 
recommend the drastic changes he desired. He wrote to 
Lloyd George protesting the resolution and demanding that 
the treaty be entirely recast. 11 fWe are endeavouring, 1 " 
he wrote, 11 Tto make a Peace of the twentieth century which 
might have been in place in the seventeenth or eighteenth, 
but which is entirely opposed to the spirit of the times, 
and may well prove disastrous from every point of view. 1
As much as Lloyd George admired Smuts, he was 
above all a practical politician who knew that expediency 
often had to take precedence over idealism. Furthermore, 
he alone of the Big Four had honestly been willing to 
make concessions to the Germans and had been trying to 
persuade his colleagues to revise the treaty. ^  Smutsfs 
lofty pronouncements from his position of lesser respon­
sibility goaded the fiery Welshman into replying with what 
was very nearly a taunt:
:,Are you prepared to forgo the claims for pensions 
and so confine compensation to material damage?
The Germans repeatedly request the return of the
26 _llillin, op. cit., ll, 222. See also Hancock,
0 0 . cit., pp. 530-31*
27'Tillman, on, cit;., o. 3t-'-3; Seyrioun, on. cit.,
IV, !j.73-7U
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colonies. Are you prepared to allow C-eraan South- 
West Arnica and German East Africa to be returned 
to Germany as a concession which, might induce them 
to sign the peace? "2<->
In answer to the questions ashed by tho Prime I.Iinister 
Smuts wrote:
"With regard to reparation, I consider the sum. 
of five thousand million mentioned both by us and 
the Germans as reasonable though high. . . . 7/e
should . . . apportion a lump sum, say two thousand
million, to restoration, and leave the rest as the 
amount divisible among the Allies In respect of 
the other claims, such as pensions. . , .
"With regard to the German colonies, I do not 
for a moment contemplate their return to Germany 
as one of the concessions we should make. No doubt 
in future, when a new atmosphere has grown up, the 
German claims to colonial mandates will come to be 
viewed in a different light and that contingency 
has to be kept In view in whatever arrangements we 
make now. But please do not have the impression 
that I would be generous at the expense of others, 
so long as the Union gets South-7/est Africa. In 
this great business South-West Africa is as dust 
compared to the burdens now hanging over the civi­
lized world. . . .
"When you are up against a position so terrible 
In Its possibilities for good and evil, you can only 
do one thing, . . . the thing you can justify to
your conscience and that of all other reasonable 
fair-minded people. This Treaty breathes a poison­
ous spirit of revenge, which may yet scorch the 
fair face— not of a corner of Europe, but of 
Europe."^9
In spite of the vigorous campaign carried on by 
Smuts and other liberal-minded delegates, the last minute 
revisions In the treaty were of slight importance. The 
decision to hold a plebiscite In Upper Silesia, instead of
^0I.iIllin, on. cit. , II, 225-26.
2Ubia. , II, 226-23.
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giving the territory to Poland outright, was the most im­
portant, 30
Smuts was so dissatisfied with the treaty that he
shared Smuts1s misgivings about the treaty, Botha, as 
Prime Minister, had to sign in order to bring South Africa 
into the League of Nations and into the position of being 
recognized as an equal to all other nations in the world. 
The two life-long friends, reluctant to part company over 
so vital an issue, brought their problem to Lloyd George, 
who advised Smuts to sign under protest and to criticize 
the treaty as much as he liked afterwards. This advice 
Smuts decided to follow.
The brief ceremony of the final signing of the 
German treaty was held in the Hall of Mirrors of the 
Palace of Versailles on June 28, 1919*-^ Smuts signed 
but published a vigorous protest the same day. His state­
ment looked not so much to the past as to the future:
rlThe real work of making peace will only begin 
after this Treaty has been signed. . . .
"The spirit of the new life, the victory of
decided, sometime in Hay, not to sign it.^* Although he
^Seymour, op. cit., jlV , 1l73.
-^Ibid. , IV, k66; Hancock, op. cit., p . 535
-^Crafford, op. cit., p. 1&2 
p. 282; Millin, op. cit., II, 252-55
6 ; Mraus, op. cit.,
Conference, I j l I ,
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the great human ideals, for which the people have 
shed their blood and their treasure without stint, 
the fulfillment of their aspirations towards a new 
international order, and a fairer, better world, 
are not written in this Treaty, and will not be 
written in treaties. ’Not in this Mountain, nor 
in Jerusalem, but in spirit and in truth, 1 as the 
Great Master said, must the foundations of the new 
order be laid. A new heart must be given, not only 
to our enemies, but also to us— a contrite spirit 
for the woes which have overwhelmed the world: a
spirit of pity, mercy and forgiveness for the sins 
and wrongs which we have suffered. A new spirit 
of generosity and humanity, born in the hearts of 
the people in this great hour of common suffering 
and sorrow, can alone heal the wounds which have 
been inflicted on the body of Christendom.
11 And this new spirit among the people will be 
the solvent for the problems which the statesmen 
have found too hard at the conference. There are 
territorial settlements which will need revision.
There are guarantees laid down which we all hope 
will soon be found out of harmony with the new 
peaceful temper and unarmed state of our former 
enemies. There are punishments foreshadowed over 
most of which a calmer mood may yet prefer to pass 
the sponge of oblivion. There are indemnities 
stipulated, which cannot be enacted without grave 
injury to the industrial revival of Europe, and 
which it will be in the interests of all to render 
more tolerable and moderate. There are numerous 
pinpricks which will cease to pain under the heal­
ing influence of the new international atmosphere.
The real peace of the peoples ought to follow, 
complete, and amend the peace of the statesmen.
!IIn this Treaty, however, two achievements of 
far reaching importance for the world are definitely 
recorded. The one is the destruction of Prussian 
militarism; the other the institution of the League 
of Nations. I am confident that the League of Na­
tions will yet prove the path of escape for Europe 
out of the ruin brought by this war. But the League 
is as yet only a form. . . • The new creative spirit
which is once more moving among the peoples in their 
anguish must fill the institution with life and with 
inspiration for the pacific ideals born of this war, 
and so convert it into a real instrument of progress. 
In that way the abolition of militarism, in this 
treaty unfortunately confined to the enemy, may soon 
come as a blessing and relief to the Allied peoples 
as well. And the enemy peoples should at the earliest
possible date join the League and, in collaboration 
with, the Allied peoples, learn to practice the great 
lesson of this war, that not in separate ambition, 
or in selfish domination, but in common service for 
the great human causes, lies the true path of na­
tional progress. This joint collaboration is espe­
cially necessary to-day for the reconstruction of 
a ruined and broken world. 11
After more in the same vein, the protest ended with an
appeal to the Germans to make an honest effort to live up
to their obligations under the treaty and to the Allies to
use their God-given victory not for selfish ends but for
the furtherance of great human ideals.
One of Smuts*s biographers said:
No formal declaration of protest in human memory 
has been more significant than was the Smuts docu- 
ment. Its chief value lay in the hope, the glowing 
promise with which, despite the Treaty, it furnished 
mankind.35
Another writer, however, speaking not of this protest alone 
but of Smuts*s continued denunciation of the Treaty of Ver­
sailles through the years, said:
Indeed, his very blunder /his protest of June 28,
19127 catapulted him to world fame. The great mor­
alist, the purest of the pure was for the Germans 1 
For years his hard-hitting phrases of condemnation 
of Versailles were quoted by the Germans, whose 
chief witness he was to remain for many years. For 
years the appeasers and the defeatists claimed Smuts 
as their man, although he was, despite his one grave 
error, the very opposite of the yellow crowd. . . .
op. cit. . II, 255-53. See also H. S. 
Baker, op. cit., II-, 520; Smuts, Jr., op. cit., pp. 213-l^G 
7/Illiam MacDonald, "General Smuts on the Peace," The Nation, 
CIX (July 5, 1919), 10-11.
Crafford, op. cit., p. 163.
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Throughout the ensuing ups and downs of his 
political fortunes, Smuts1 moral authority grew.
His^shadow loomed large over the globe, which his 
vision embraced as a whole. The testimony of such 
a man was worth more to Germany than the secretly 
built Luftwaffe. 3°
The same writer also said:
He was wrong, entirely and definitely wrong, in 
taking Germany to his heart. He believed In that 
fallacious difference between Prussian militarism 
and the German people that for twenty years confused 
the minds of world democracy, and he was foremost 
in creating that perverted guilt-complex, prevailing, 
above all, among English-speaking peoples, that made 
the victors of Versailles throw away their bitterly 
won supremacy, and allowed a charlatan to plunge the 
world Into the gravest catastrophe of all time. If 
Versailles erred, it erred on the side of leniency.37
Although the protest of June 28 was Smuts1s last 
pronouncement as a Peace Conference delegate, his farewell 
message upon leaving England for South Africa in July be­
longs to Peace Conference history. He spoke of other 
matters, such as Russia, the British dominions, and the 
Irish problem, but the treaty was also in his thoughts.
The treaty, he said, should be accepted as a fact; mankind 
should look to the future in hope. All bitterness to 
Germany should be forgotten and all. shoLild work together 
for the good of Europe and the world. He continued:
You cannot have a stable Europe without a stable,
3^Kraus, op. cit., pp. 2 8 2-8 3 -
37ibid., p. 2 6 9 . rrIt should always be remem­
bered that the principal beneficiary of the phrase Tthe 
errors of Versailles1 has been Hitler and Germany.1' 
IvIcCallum, op. cit. , p. vii.
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settled Germany, and you cannot have a stable, 
settled, prosperous Great Britain while Europe is 
weltering in confusion and unsettlement next door.
• . . I see salvation for us and the v^ orld only in
a more human spirit and outlook all around. . . .
Let us move forward with courage and in faith and 
let us not fall back into the hopeless enmities, 
the sterile and blasting bitterness of the p a s t . 3 &
Smuts indirectly influenced the subsequent history
of the treaty in another way. John Maynard Keynes, the
chief representative of the British Treasury in Paris and
an admirer of Smuts, was so sure the treaty was all wrong
that he resigned his post and left Paris in June before
the treaty was signed. Soon afterwards he wrote Smuts,
asking the older nan1s advice as to what he could do about
the treaty. Smuts answered at once:
” 1 think it would be very advisable for you as soon 
as possible to set about writing a clear connected 
account of what the financial and economic clauses 
of the Treaty actually are and mean, and what their 
probable results will be. It should not be too long 
or technical, as we may want to appeal to the plain 
man more than to the well informed or the specialist. 11
Keynes took up the suggestion with alacrity and the result
was, of course, The Economic Consequences of the Peace.
The book was an immediate sensation in both Britain and
the United States. Keynes proved to be not only a brilliant
polemicist but also a master of sarcasm. His caricature
11 General Smuts: Statesman," Hew Republic, XX
(September 17, 1919), 200-202. See also Millin, op. cit.,
II, 270-72; Hancock, op. cit. , p. $1^7*
^Millin, op. cit., IX, 237-33.
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of Wilson became so well known that even today it is often 
the accepted picture of Wilson at the Peace Conference. 
Keynes portrayed Wilson as a dull-witted, strait-laced 
Puritan who Was "bamboozled" by Lloyd George and Clemenceau 
into giving up his ideals for a peace of the old world 
type*^*0 Keynes' s book was used In the United States Sen­
ate to help defeat the Versailles Treaty, which included 
the League of Nations.^1 Y/ithout the cooperation of the 
United States neither the treaty nor the League had a chance 
of success. Thus, Ironically, Smuts's influence on his 
friend helped bring about the crippling of the League and 
the very state of affairs in Europe which Smuts had pre­
dicted would be the result of the treaty.^
^Keynes, op. cit., pp.
^Llewellyn Woodward, "A British View of Mr. Wil­
son1 s Foreign Policy," Wilson's Foreign Policy in Perspec­
tive , ed. Edward H. Buehrig (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana 
University Press, 1957), pp. lij-1-51.
^McCallum, op. cit. , pp. 3 9 Uillin, on. cit.,
II, 239; Crafford, op. cit., pp. 152-53.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS
Jan Christian Smuts exerted an influence at the 
Paris Peace Conference of 1919 out of all proportion to 
liis official position as a member of the delegation from 
the Union of South Africa. His influence on the Treaty 
of Versailles can be read with certainty in the League of 
Nations Covenant and in the reparations settlement.
Smuts*s work on the League of Nations Covenant 
has rightly earned almost universal praise. It has been 
said that "Wilson, whose great reputation Is deservedly 
based on his vision and sponsorship of the League of 
Nations, owes much in this regard to the political con­
cepts and acumen of his friend Smuts.11-^ Both Wilson and 
Smuts were Idealists, devoted to the idea of an inter­
national organization for peace. Partly because of the 
close affinity between these two men, Smuts was able to 
play the prominent role that he did in the creation of the 
League of Nations. A more important reason for his influ­
ence, however, was the fact that he brought to Paris a 
more complete and more practical plan for an International 
organisation than did any other delegate* The excellence 
of Smuts * s plan assured him a seat on the League of Nation
*^Curry, op. cit. , p. 9^6.
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Commission at the Conference, and many of the ideas ex­
pressed in his plan found a place in the League of Nations 
Covenant as finally drafted and accepted.
The system of mandates established under the League 
of Nations was also influenced by Smuts. Here it was the 
realistic rather than the id.ealistic side of Smuts’s char­
acter which prevailed. Smuts, the practical man of affairs, 
was able to produce a compromise solution to the problem 
of the German colonies that we.s accepted as being in har­
mony with both the Ideals of Wilson and the annexationist 
schemes of some of the other delegates. Smuts’s role in 
the mandates controversy has not always been commended, 
but, undei* the circumstances, It is hard to conceive what 
better solution could have been found, than the one Smuts 
suggested. The system worked, on the whole, rather well 
and was less severely criticized during the years ahead 
than at the Conference itself.
Smuts rs role in the reparations settlement has 
frequently been assailed by his critics, but It too can 
be defended. The single act of Smuts with regard to 
reparations was his writing of the memorandum on pensions 
and allowances,^ which seems to have been the deciding 
factor in Wilson’s decision to include pensions in repara­
tions. Here again it was the similarity In the Idealism
2See above, pp. 7§-80.
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of the two which caused Wilson to accept Smuts’s opinion 
in a field far removed from the realm of ideals and the 
matter of International organization. It should be em­
phasized that Smuts believed, when he wrote his memorandum, 
that a fixed sum for reparations would be stated in the 
treaty and that his suggestions would influence only the 
distribution of such a fixed amount. Smuts*s mistake was 
that of allowing himself to be drawn into the reparations 
controversy at all, as it was not an area \7ith which he was 
thoroughly familiar. Pensions would probably have been 
included without Smuts*s intervention, and he could have 
avoided much calumny in the future by refusing to become 
involved in the matter. It was not, however, Smuts *s na­
ture to sidestep an issue out of mere self-interest.
Smuts’s mission to Hungary accomplished little of 
a positive nature. Nevertheless, the fact that he was 
selected to represent the Conference on a delicate diplo­
matic errand showed the respect and confidence he enjoyed 
among the other delegates.
Smuts attracted more attention at Paris by his 
campaign to have the German treaty revised than by any of 
his other actions. His efforts to create a just but 
merciful peace were completely sincere. It must be remem­
bered, however, that he was not one of the Big Four and 
did not have the same degree of responsibility for deci­
sions as did Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd (George. It is
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doubtful whether he could have made a better treaty if he 
had been a member of the Supreme Council. There were, in 
19199 too many conflicting claims to be resolved and far 
too many recent and deep wounds to be healed.
Although many writers have criticized the treaty 
with (Germany, others have contended that it was the best 
treaty that could have been written under the circumstances. 
It contained provisions for revision, under the League of 
Nations, although such revision was little used by the 
statesmen of the next two decades. Smuts deserves nothing 
but praise for following the d.Ictates of his conscience 
during the period when the treaty was under discussion.
Once the treaty was finally drafted and signed, however, 
the situation was entirely different. Smuts then might 
have served, humanity better had he used his grea.t moral 
influence to uphold the Versailles settlement rather than 
to attack it. This latter action helped establish the 
guilt-complex, widely held by the English-speaking peoples 
In the post-war years, and did much to create the atmos­
phere which Hitler used to such advantage In his rise to 
power during the decade of the thirties. Had the Allies 
maintained a solid front in peace as they had In war, the 
treaty might have been better enforced and, as hoped by 
many In 1919* gradually revised* Reparations might have 
been scaled down and other harsh features of the treaty 
eliminated or softened. At the sane tine, Germany would
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have been prevented from capitalizing on the disunity and 
defeatism of the former Allies.
These conclusions, of course, go beyond Smuts’s 
work at Paris in 1919* There he shov/ed himself a wise, 
honest, sincere, practical negotiator. The most important 
outcome of the Conference may well have been the League of 
Nations. For his v/ork on the Covenant, above all else that 
he accomplished at Paris in 1919* ^an Christian Smuts de­
serves to be remembered and revered.
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